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I. Introduction
Despite the general understanding that paying taxes is fundamental to
a functioning democracy,1 Americans continue to debate who should in fact
pay them, and how much.2 Passionate debate concerning what the law

1. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2010 Taxpayer Attitude Survey 5 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2011/IRSOB%202010%20Taxpayer%
20Attitude%20Survey.pdf (providing statistically, in 2010, that 97% of Americans agree it is
every American’s civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes, and that 96% of Americans
agree everyone who cheats on their taxes should be held accountable).
2. See, e.g., J. Aaron Ball, The Sea Clammers Doctrine: Reeling in Private
Employment Tax Claims in Worker Misclassification Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
215, 249 n.226 (2003) ("Whether a tax or a method of taxation is ‘fair’ is a never-ending
debate since there is no definitive standard of fairness."); see also William G. Gale, Book
Note, Tax Reform in the Real World, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 387, 387 (1998) (reviewing
MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997)) ("[T]ax policy
debates are a never-ending source of amusement and frustration . . . . [B]ashing the tax
system (and the IRS) is often good politics regardless of the actual merit of the proposed
reforms."); Marjorie E. Kornheuser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Towards
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 212 (1994) ("Throughout its history, the
income tax laws and the debates surrounding them have reflected, to varying degrees,
American society’s contradictory attitudes about earned income and wealth.").
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should be is a healthy aspect of democratic society.3 But noncompliance
with established tax law challenges the legitimacy of our government.4 The
unwillingness of both citizens and corporations to pay their taxes in full and
on time is cause for concern.5
In February 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported that the
deficit tax gap in 2001 was approximately $350 billion, which reflected a
compliance rate of 83.7%.6 Over 15% of U.S. taxpayers failed to pay their
taxes in full, which "creates public cynicism in the fairness and
effectiveness of our voluntary compliance system."7 Despite declarations
of Congress to remedy the problem,8 the tax gap in America remains an
unresolved issue.9
The American taxpayer may fear being audited by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), but in reality less than 1% of tax returns are audited
3. See President Barack Obama, First Presidential Press Conference (Feb. 9, 2009)
("The strongest democracies flourish from frequent and lively debate, but they endure when
people of every background and belief find a way to set aside smaller differences in service
of a greater purpose.").
4. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of
Tax Protests and the Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 823–24 (2002)
(discussing how antitax rhetoric has the potential to increase noncompliance, encourage
antigovernment sentiment, threaten the legitimacy of government, and "endanger the
existence of the state by strangling its means of support").
5. See id. at 873 ("Fair collection means that everyone pays the appropriate amount
of tax that the law assesses. . . . The perceived or actual failure of large numbers of
taxpayers to pay their taxes ‘adversely’ affects voluntary compliance by the rest . . . because
of their diminished faith in the fairness of the tax."). See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2008) (discussing the lack of tax
compliance in the United States and providing potential solutions such as the creation of a
more cooperative than adversarial tax system).
6. See Brett Wells, Voluntary Compliance: "This Return Might Be Correct But
Probably Isn’t," 29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 647 (2010) ("The ‘tax gap’ refers to the difference
between what taxpayers own on their return and the amount that they voluntarily pay in a
timely manner. For 2001, the IRS estimates that the tax gap was $345 billion. This
represents a compliance gap of 16.3% for that year." (citations omitted)); see also Ventry,
Cooperative Tax Regulation, supra note 5, at 433 (stating that in February 2006, the IRS
announced a 2001 tax gap of as much as $353 billion and a compliance rate of 83.7%).
7. Wells, supra note 6, at 648–49.
8. See Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, supra note 5, at 433 (providing Senator
Max Baucus’s response to the tax gap statistic, in which Baucus stated, "When people and
companies . . . don’t pay their taxes, the burden for paying this country’s expense falls even
more heavily on Americans who do their duty every April 15").
9. See Wells, supra note 6, at 647–48 ("Congress has called for more aggressive
efforts to reduce the tax gap. To achieve this objective, Congress, the U.S. Treasury
Department, and respected tax scholars have offered numerous solutions. And yet, the
reality is that the tax gap has remained largely unchanged since 1973.").
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on an annual basis.10 Regardless of its efforts to enforce tax compliance,
the IRS will continue to rely on individuals and entities to engage in their
"‘civic duty to participate in defraying the costs of government.’"11 As a
result, taxpayers can risk underpaying their tax obligations and realistically
avoid any adjustments or penalties. The potential for corporate taxpayers to
underpay by millions, if not billions, of dollars casts serious doubt on the
IRS’s ability to collect the appropriate revenues.12
U.C. Davis School of Law Professor Dennis Ventry, Jr. blames the
IRS’s failure to better enforce tax compliance on the disclosure gap: "IRS
enforcement is so severely handicapped by informational deficiencies that
taxpayers can engage in abusive tax planning and accurately report
transactions associated with that planning on appropriate disclosure forms,
yet still provide no indication of abusive behavior."13 The disclosure gap is
at its greatest with respect to large public corporations, which produce
highly complex tax returns—often containing thousands of pages14—that
require greater manpower and resources than the average individual
taxpayer’s return.15
10. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, 2009, PUBLICATION 55, at 22, available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf (stating that the percentage of returns
examined in the 2009 fiscal year was roughly 0.9%). This statistic may be misleading
because the IRS uses other methods to collect revenues. See W. PATRICK CANTRELL,
FEDERAL TAX PROCEDURE FOR ATTORNEYS 20–21 (2008) (providing that the IRS uses other
methods such as the Financial Status Audit and Form 4822). Additionally, large
corporations are commonly audited more frequently than the average individual taxpayer.
See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, 123 TAX
NOTES 875, 881 (2009) (stating that corporate taxpayers are subject to contiguous audit
cycles).
11. Wells, supra note 6, at 650 (quoting COMM’R’S EXEC. TASK FORCE ON CIVIL
PENALTIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, 89 TNT 45-36
(Feb. 21, 1989)); see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219,
223 (1944) (stating that the correct self-assessment of the American taxpayer will continue
to be "the basis of our American scheme of income taxation").
12. See Wells, supra note 6, at 660 (providing that, in a 2007 research report that
reviewed 361 of the S&P 500 companies, sixty-two companies claimed over $500 million of
tax benefits from unsustainable tax positions, and thirty-six of those companies claimed over
$1 billion of tax benefits from unsustainable tax positions).
13. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, 120 TAX NOTES 857, 877
(2008).
14. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (stating that Textron’s tax return at issue in this case consisted of more than 4,000
pages).
15. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 871 ("The tax
returns and accompanying disclosure statements for these taxpayers are exceedingly
complex, run thousands of pages in length, and reflect the form rather than the substance of
the taxpayer’s transactional history."); see also Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for
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Along with producing eye-opening tax gap statistics, 2001 also marked
the beginning of a growing public concern about the accuracy of public
corporations’ financial statements.16
Scandals involving Enron,
WorldCom, and Tyco revealed the nation’s corporate fraud problem, which
included deceptive accounting practices and misleading financial
statements.17 The failure to "adequately disclose to the user of the financial
statements the nature of the risks that were imminent" led to a sharp decline
in public confidence and served as a catalyst for congressional and
regulatory action.18
Both Congress and government agencies enacted reforms to promote
the transparency of financial statements and greater tax compliance by
public corporations.19 Public sentiment continues to support increased
regulation and enforcement of corporations’ proper reporting and payment
of tax obligations.20 Not surprisingly, compliance with these new laws and
Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 881 ("Although corporate taxpayers are subject to annual
audit through contiguous audit cycles, the IRS may never be able to identify a particular
transaction to challenge, let alone litigate. Corporate returns are exceedingly complex.").
16. See Wells, supra note 6, at 651 ("In the fall of 2001, Congress and the regulatory
agencies faced a crisis in public confidence with respect to the financial reporting of public
companies.").
17. See Chris Jung, Note, Textron:
The False Choice Between Financial
Transparency and Litigant Confidentiality, 7 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 393, 393 (2010)
(providing examples of major corporate fraud within the past ten years, including Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
18. Wells, supra note 6, at 651; see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 5 (Kristin A. Fischer et al. eds., 2010) (stating that this action focused
on "the regulation of public accountants, the formulation of accounting standards,
accelerating corporate disclosure, assuring reliability of corporate disclosure, [and] corporate
governance").
19. See, e.g., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006)
(requiring the principal executive officer and the principal financial officer to certify the
reliability of the company’s financial statements and its internal control procedures under
penalties of perjury); Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Interpretation No. 48:
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, in 281-B FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES 3
(June 2006) (stating that evaluating a company’s tax position requires (1) determining if the
tax position is more likely than not to be sustained upon examination, and, if so, (2) a
recognition on the company’s financial statement of the largest amount benefit that has a
greater than 50% likelihood of being realized); Regulations Governing the Practice of
Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, Enrolled
Retirement Plan Agents, and Appraisers Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.35 (2011) (providing a general set of standards applicable to all tax advice, and
heightened level of requirements for tax advice constituting a "covered opinion").
20. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2010 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 5, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2011/IRSOB%202010%20Taxpayer%20Attitude%20
Survey.pdf (providing statistically that the majority of Americans (98%) feel that it is more
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regulations revealed significant underpayments by public corporations on
their tax returns—ranging in the hundreds of millions to billions of
dollars.21 Despite the efforts to increase transparency, public corporations
continue to claim positions on their tax returns that they do not believe to be
sustainable.22
This Note discusses the use of a public corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers to (1) shrink the IRS-taxpayer disclosure gap and (2) hold those
corporations accountable for knowingly taking unsustainable positions on
their tax returns. Further, this Note addresses criticisms and concerns
regarding the use of these materials as a resource during an IRS audit
investigation.23
On May 24, 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review United
States v. Textron Inc. and Subsidiaries,24 in which the First Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that Textron Inc.’s tax accrual workpapers were not
protected from an IRS summons under the work product doctrine.25 The
Court’s decision to not review Textron raised concerns about how the
decision will affect future business practices and the work product
doctrine’s scope.26 The discussion includes criticisms of the majority
important to ensure that corporations are reporting and paying taxes correctly than highincome taxpayers, small businesses, and low-income taxpayers).
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing a 2007 research report).
22. See Wells, supra note 6, at 660–61 (discussing how companies continue to claim
tax positions in their tax returns even though it is determined that such tax positions are
incorrect).
23. See OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NOTICE CC-2004-010:
REQUESTS FOR TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS (2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/
ForTaxProfs/irs-ccdm/2004/cc-2004-010.pdf ("The term ‘tax accrual workpapers’ means
those audit workpapers relating to the tax reserve for current, deferred and potential or
contingent tax liabilities, however classified or reported on audited financial statements, and
to footnotes disclosing those tax liabilities appearing on audited financial statements.").
24. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 31–32 (1st Cir.
2009) (en banc) (holding that the work product doctrine does not shield tax accrual
workpapers from an IRS summons).
25. See Textron & Subsidiaries v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320, 3320 (2010)
("Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
denied.").
26. See Noah P. Barsky et al., Protecting a Client’s Confidences: Recent
Developments in Privileged Communications Between Attorneys and Accountants, 28 J.L. &
COM. 211, 232–36 (2010) (providing a summary of the case, recommendations for how
practitioners should maintain privilege protections over client information, and a discussion
of the unresolved issues of privilege law in relation to complex tax transactions); Wells,
supra note 6, at 688–91 (discussing the underlying reasons for creating tax accrual
workpapers, the Textron decision, and why the court’s decision was correct); Jacob A.
Kling, Comment, Tax Cases Make Bad Work Product Law: The Discoverability of
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opinion’s lack of clarity, as well as concerns that the First Circuit
established a new test to determine whether the work product doctrine
should apply to certain documents or materials.27 This Note will
demonstrate that the controversy surrounding the First Circuit’s analysis of
whether the work product doctrine should protect a public corporation’s tax
accrual workpapers is unfounded and inconsistent with the work product
doctrine as stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, public policy, and
reform efforts to promote greater transparency of financial statements and
tax compliance.28
Litigation Risk Assessments After United States v. Textron, 119 YALE L.J. 1715, 1715 (2010)
("[The decision] may deter companies, public and nonpublic, from voluntarily preparing
litigation risk assessments that estimate the company’s contingent liabilities for the benefit
of third parties . . . ."); Sarah S. Mallet, Case Note, Work Product Doctrine—The First
Circuit Further Confuses an Existing Circuit Split in United States v. Textron Inc., 63 SMU
L. REV. 251, 257 (2010) ("The problem with the First Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Textron Inc. is not in its holding, but rather its flawed, incomplete, and misguided
reasoning."); Ryan D. Houck & Virginia Sorrell, Recent Development, Textron and the
Work Product Doctrine: Maintaining Attorney Independence for Non-Adversarial Advising,
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 666 (2010) (stating that "Textron may increase existing
systematic and situational pressures on attorneys to favor their role as zealous advocates
over their role as officers of the court").
27. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Judge
Torruella’s dissenting opinion in Textron makes a strong argument that while the court said
it was applying the ‘because of’ test, it actually asked whether the documents were ‘prepared
for use in possible litigation,’ a much more exacting standard."); see also Cosme Caballero,
Curbing Corporate Abuse from Jurisprudential Off-Sites: Problematic Paradigms in United
States v. Textron Inc., 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 645, 666 (2011) ("The majority’s new work
product inquiry, which calls upon courts to ask if documents are prepared for use in
litigation, overly narrows the scope of work product protection."); Tracy Hamilton, Work
Product Privilege: The Future of Tax Accrual Work Paper Discovery in the Eleventh
Circuit After Textron, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 734–35 (2011) (accusing the First Circuit of
ignoring the adopted "because of" test and creating a new "for use in litigation" test, which
narrowed the historical scope of work product protection); Jung, supra note 17, at 395
(stating that the First Circuit created a new standard for work product protection, under
which only documents created "for use" in litigation are shielded from discovery); Mallet,
supra note 26, at 251 (stating that the First Circuit "overlooked the widespread consequences
of further fragmenting an already divided interpretation of the phrase ‘in anticipation of
litigation’"); Stacey Roberts, Note, Work Product Protection, Tax Accrual Documents, and
United States v. Textron, Inc.: Why the First Circuit Got It Right for the Wrong Reasons, 16
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 53, 78 (2011) (stating the possibility that the First Circuit
created a new test even though it affirmed the "because of" test as precedent); Lindsay
Sullivan, Note, Tax Accrual Work Papers & Textron: When Litigation Strategy Is Not
Protected?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that although the opinion
affirmed the "because of" test, it "actually created a new ‘for use’ standard without explicitly
stating its reasons for such a change").
28. See infra Part VI.D (arguing that public policy evidence in Supreme Court
decisions and regulations supports denial of work product protection to tax accrual
workpapers when requested by the IRS).
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Part II of this Note will explain why public corporations create tax
accrual workpapers, what they entail, and when it is the IRS’s policy to
request these materials during an audit investigation.
Part III will discuss the evolution and codification of the work product
doctrine. It will focus on the judicial interpretations of the phrase "in
anticipation of litigation" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),29
its temporal and motivational components,30 and the existing circuit split
over the appropriate test to use when determining whether documents or
materials are protected by the work product doctrine.31
Part IV will summarize the facts leading up to Textron, as well as both
the majority and dissenting opinions. It will clarify the analysis and
arguments relied upon by the majority in its decision to not extend work
product protection to Textron’s tax accrual workpapers.32 It will address
the dissent’s counterarguments and concerns as well.
Part V will argue that the dissent failed to raise any legitimate
concerns in response to the majority’s holding, incorrectly applied the
"because of" test to determine whether work product immunity applies to a
public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers, and erroneously concluded
that related caselaw was "fatal" to the majority’s holding.33 It will also
argue that although the majority’s analysis welcomed speculation that it
applied a new "for use" test,34 the majority ultimately applied the correct
test to determine whether work product protection applies to a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers and correctly concluded that they do
not deserve work product protection under the "because of" test.
Part VI will argue that regardless of the test applied by the court in its
determination, a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers do not deserve
work product protection and should be discoverable under an IRS
summons. The stated arguments for this conclusion are: (1) tax accrual
workpapers fall under the "ordinary course of business" exception; (2) the
29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) ("[A] party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . .").
30. See infra Part III.A (providing the elements of both components).
31. See infra Part III.B (discussing the preexisting circuit split and accusations that the
majority in Textron added further uncertainty).
32. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) ("[T]he Textron work papers were independently required by statutory and audit
requirements and . . . the work product privilege does not apply.").
33. See id. at 33 (Torruella, J., dissenting) ("Adlman’s articulation of the ‘because of’
test is fatal to the majority’s position.").
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing examples of the allegations
surrounding Textron that accuse the First Circuit of creating a new "for use" test).
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potential for litigation at the time of their creation is too remote to be
considered "in anticipation of litigation"; (3) an IRS audit and subsequent
administrative proceedings do not constitute "litigation" for work product
doctrine purposes; (4) public policy favors erring on the side of more
disclosure to the government when it involves tax-compliance and
preventing tax-sheltering practices; and (5) the IRS has a substantial need
for the information provided in a public corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers.
Part VII will provide concluding remarks.
II. What Are Tax Accrual Workpapers?
Public corporations are required by law to provide public financial
statements—certified by an independent auditor—and file them with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).35 In preparing these financial
statements, corporations calculate reserves to enter into the company books
for contingent tax liabilities, which include estimates of potential liability if
the IRS challenges the corporation’s tax positions.36 The independent
auditor examines the corporation’s books to determine whether they
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and then
issues an opinion as to "whether the financial statements, taken as a whole,
fairly present the financial position and operations of the corporation for the
relevant period."37 The auditor’s analysis includes a determination of the
adequacy and reasonableness of the corporation’s reserves for contingent
tax liabilities.38 In its determination of the potential cost of each liability
and the probability of additional liability, the auditor relies on a variety of

35. See Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(l), 78(m) (2006) (providing the
general requirement for registering securities and the reporting responsibilities of an issuer
of a security, and citing "public interest" and the "the protection of investors" as factors for
the Securities Exchange Commission to consider); see also United States. v. Arthur Young
& Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810–11 (1984) ("In an effort to control the accuracy of the financial
data available to investors . . . various provisions of the federal securities laws require public
corporations to file their financial statements with the [SEC]. . . . [T]hese financial reports
must be audited by an independent certified public accountant.").
36. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 22–23 (outlining the legal requirements of Textron
relating to the creation of tax accrual workpapers).
37. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 811 (citations omitted).
38. See id. at 812 ("The presence of a reserve account for such contingent tax
liabilities reflects the corporation’s awareness of, and preparedness for, the possibility of an
assessment of additional taxes.").
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sources.39 One of these resources is the corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers.
Tax accrual workpapers contain information that identifies
questionable tax positions taken by a corporation on its tax return and
reflect the validity of those positions.40 They provide valuable information
that assists IRS efforts to assess what further taxes, if any, a public
corporation owes.41 For example, the workpapers at issue in Textron
contained a spreadsheet listing each questionable tax item, and included the
dollar amount at issue and the probability of liability for each item
identified.42 They help to "pinpoint the ‘soft spots’ on a corporation’s tax
return by highlighting those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has taken
a position that may, at some later date, require the payment of additional
taxes."43 Because a corporation’s financial statements usually do not
identify the specific liabilities, but rather present a total reserve figure, the
tax accrual workpapers are a helpful resource to the IRS during an audit
investigation.44 Despite the obvious advantages of having access to tax
accrual workpapers, the IRS has shown restraint in its requests for
Typically, the IRS limits
workpapers under 26 U.S.C. § 7602.45
39. See id. at 812–13 (discussing the requirements of an independent auditor and what
sources it utilizes, including "the corporation’s books, records, and tax returns" as well as
"interviews with corporate personnel, judgments on questions of potential tax liability, and
suggestions for alternative treatments of certain transactions for tax purposes").
40. See id. at 808 (defining tax accrual workpapers as documents or memoranda
relating to the evaluation of a company’s contingent tax liabilities, which can contain
information regarding a (1) company’s financial transactions, (2) questionable positions it
may have taken on its tax returns, and (3) a company’s explanation for those positions).
41. See id. at 815 ("It is the responsibility of the IRS to determine whether the
corporate taxpayer in completing its return has stretched a particular tax concept beyond
what is allowed. Records that illuminate any aspect of the return . . . are therefore highly
relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry.").
42. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (describing the contents of Textron’s tax accrual workpapers).
43. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984).
44. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 23 ("A company’s published financial statements do not
normally indentify the specific tax items on the return that may be debatable, but incorporate
or reflect only the total reserve figure.").
45. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2006) (stating that "[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the
liability of any person . . . in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such
liability" the IRS is authorized to examine and summon certain materials); see also OFFICE
OF CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NOTICE CC-2004-010 (2004): REQUESTS FOR
TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS (2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irsccdm/2004/cc-2004-010.pdf ("Because of the sensitive nature of requests for tax accrual
workpapers, field attorneys are to work with the operating divisions in preparing any
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workpapers requests to taxpayer returns listing a transaction "that is the
same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the
[IRS] has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and identified by
notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed
transaction."46
The IRS announced this "listed transaction" policy in 2002 and
explained that it was necessary "to allow the [IRS] to fulfill its obligation to
the public to curb abusive tax avoidance transactions and to ensure that
taxpayers are in compliance with the tax laws."47 Although it loosened the
traditional policy for requesting tax accrual workpapers during an audit, it is
consistent with the trend toward greater transparency and accountability.48
It provided that the IRS may request tax accrual workpapers for any return
that claims a tax benefit arising out of a transaction, or substantially similar
transaction, that the IRS identified as a potential tax-sheltering or abusive
transaction.49 If the listed transaction is disclosed, then the request usually
is for workpapers pertaining to that listed transaction.50 If the listed
transaction is not disclosed, or if the IRS determines there are multiple
listed transactions, regardless of disclosure, then the request is for all tax
accrual workpapers for that year’s return.51
requests for tax accrual workpapers and will review proposed summonses for tax accrual
workpapers.").
46. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2010).
47. Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers: Announcement
2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.), July 8, 2002, at
72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf.
48. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 880 ("The most
notable substantive change in the policy [of restraint] over the last [twenty] years has
involved responding to the proliferation of abusive tax shelters.").
49. Id.; Internal Revenue Serv., Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions-LB&I
Tier I Issues, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id= 204155,00.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2011) (listing the approximately forty potential tax-sheltering or abusive
transactions in alphabetical order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This
list includes sale-in, lease-out (SILO) transactions, which were the transactions at issue in
Textron. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 (stating that a Textron subsidiary engaged in nine
SILO transactions in which the subsidiary purchased equipment from a foreign utility or
transit operator and leased it back to the seller on the same day).
50. See Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers:
Announcement 2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.),
July 8, 2002, at 72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf (outlining the
new policy for workpapers requests).
51. See id. (providing when requests will be made for all tax accrual workpapers and
not just those related to the listed transaction at issue). This was the request made in
Textron. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 ("[W]here (as in Textron’s case) the taxpayer claims
benefits from multiple listed transactions, the IRS seeks all of the workpapers for the tax
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In its announcement, the IRS cited the Supreme Court’s approval of
the right to obtain tax accrual workpapers under the IRS’s summons power.
They stated that workpapers are not privileged communications because
they are not "generated in connection with seeking legal or tax advice, but
are developed to evaluate a taxpayer’s deferred or contingent tax liabilities
in connection with a taxpayer’s disclosure to third parties."52 However, the
IRS emphasized that the request for tax accrual workpapers is not a
"standard examination technique."53 It makes such requests only in
"unusual circumstances" and exercises its authority to do so with restraint.54
III. The Work Product Doctrine
There are several privileges, doctrines, or immunities used by litigants
to protect sensitive materials, maintain confidentiality, and prevent other
parties from gaining advantages that are discouraged by the legal
community.55 The particular protection addressed in this Note is the work
product doctrine, as stated in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.56 Disagreement over whether the work product doctrine should
apply to a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers is the root of the
controversy with respect to the majority’s decision in Textron.57
year in question.").
52. Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers: Announcement
2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.), July 8, 2002, at
72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Catherine C. Stern, Note, Don’t Tell Mom the Babysitter’s Dead:
Arguments for a Federal Parent-Child Privilege and a Proposal to Amend Article V, 99
GEO. L.J. 605, 612 (2011) ("Currently, the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize several
privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, the spousal privilege, and a
psychotherapist-patient privilege."). Several other examples are the work product doctrine,
doctor-patient privilege, and common interest privilege.
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) ("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."). Note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
enforcement proceedings for an IRS summons. See 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2010) ("If any
person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to . . . produce books, papers, records,
or other data, the United States district court for the district in which the person resides or is
found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance . . . .").
57. Compare Kling, supra note 26, at 1726 ("The court’s holding will likely chill the
socially valuable preparation of such analyses in connection with business transactions and
may reduce the accuracy of public companies’ financial statements."), with Henry J. Lischer,
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The objective of the work product doctrine is to "establish a ‘zone of
privacy for strategic litigation planning’ and to prevent one party from
piggybacking on another party’s preparation."58 A popular treatise on the
topic notes that "the protection given to ‘work product’ arises from a
common assumption—that an attorney cannot provide full and adequate
representation unless certain matters are kept beyond the knowledge of
adversaries."59 Litigants use the doctrine to protect documents, materials,
and legal opinions that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for actual
trial.60 In recent applications of the work product doctrine, courts have
indicated a trend toward greater transparency and a narrowing of the
protection’s applicability.61 However, courts and attorneys continue to
struggle with the doctrine’s scope and its applicability to specific materials
and contexts.62
Although legal scholars, judges, and attorneys often associate the
attorney-client privilege with the work product doctrine, the current "work
product doctrine actually differs dramatically from the [attorney-client
privilege] in nearly every respect."63 The work product doctrine provides
broader protection than the attorney-client privilege because it protects
materials created by both lawyers and non-lawyers that can be shared
Jr., Work Product Immunity for Attorney-Created Tax Accrual Workpapers?: The Aftermath
of United States v. Textron, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 503, 563 (2011) ("If the courts were to hold
that attorney-created tax accrual workpapers are protected by work product immunity, work
product immunity would be wandering far from its roots of protecting the litigation process,
and arguably the immunity would provide protection to a vast class of documents that relate
to compliance . . . .").
58. Barsky et al., supra note 26, at 217–18 (quoting United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d
1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995)).
59. 2 EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 791 (5th ed. 2007).
60. See Wells, supra note 6, at 688 (providing background information about the work
product doctrine and its objectives). The work product doctrine also protects an attorney’s
mental impressions relating to the litigation, which are defined as opinion work product
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) ("[The court]
must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.").
61. See THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND
DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 102 (Vincent S. Walkowiak, ed., 4th ed. 2008) (discussing
how societal changes have driven courts to narrow the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine to promote greater disclosure in corporate settings).
62. See Colin P. Marks, The Anticipation Misconception, 99 KY. L.J. 9, 14 (2010)
("[The] variance in the stringency of what qualifies as work product . . . has created a lack of
uniformity across judicial districts . . . .").
63. 2 THOMAS E. SPAHN, THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 423 (2007).
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without constituting a waiver of the protection.64 However, the work
product doctrine provides less protection than the attorney-client privilege’s
absolute immunity because it is rebuttable by a showing of "substantial
need" for disclosure.65 Whereas the attorney-client privilege lasts beyond
death, the work product doctrine "has a more limited temporal scope."66 It
arises only during litigation and when litigation is reasonably anticipated.67
The distinction between the work product doctrine and attorney-client
privilege is important because one may cover materials that are unprotected
by the other, and litigants often attempt to extend the scope of one’s
protection when the other fails to provide any.68 When the attorney-client
privilege is not applicable—as in Textron69—the work product doctrine
may still be applicable.
Prior to the creation of the doctrine, the common law recognized the
need to protect client-created materials for use in pending litigation.70 The
U.S. Supreme Court first articulated this concept as the attorney work
product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor.71 In 1970, the common-law work
64. See id. at 433 ("The work product doctrine provides a broader protection than the
attorney-client privilege in several respects. The work product doctrine (i) protects materials
created by non-lawyers as well as lawyers and (ii) can be shared without necessarily causing
a waiver.").
65. See id. at 431 ("Most courts describe the work product doctrine as providing only a
qualified or limited protection. Although a few courts provide absolute protection to opinion
work product, all or nearly all of a litigant’s work product might be available to the other
side if it can provide a sufficient justification."); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)
(stating that documents or materials subject to work product protection may be discoverable
if "the party shows that it has a substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and
cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means").
66. SPAHN, supra note 63, at 431.
67. Id. at 433 (discussing how in some respects the work product doctrine provides a
narrower protection than the attorney-client privilege).
68. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
883 (stating that courts should be "wary of expanding the work product doctrine so far that it
transforms [work product protection] into a ‘backstop’ for other privileges" and immunities).
69. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 25 (stating that by disclosing its workpapers to Ernst &
Young, Textron waived the attorney-client privilege).
70. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 423 (providing the history of the work product
doctrine prior to its codification, and stating that it was considered an aspect of the attorneyclient privilege).
71. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) (holding that the petitioner gave
insufficient reasons for the disclosure of the opposing party’s materials, and affirming the
Court of Appeals denial); id. at 511 ("This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case . . . as the ‘Work product of the lawyer.’" (quoting Hickman v.
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product doctrine was codified under Rule 26(b)(3).72 Courts continue to
rely on Hickman to determine whether the work product doctrine should
apply to certain materials.73 In Hickman, the Court established three
propositions: (1) material collected by counsel in the course of preparation
for possible litigation is protected from discovery; (2) an adversary may
obtain discovery by showing sufficient need for the material; and (3) an
attorney’s opinion work, including theories, analysis, mental impressions,
and beliefs, receives the highest level of protection.74 These propositions
are useful to consider when interpreting the codified version of the work
product doctrine under Rule 26(b)(3) and play an important role in
analyzing whether workpapers should receive work product immunity.75
A. The Meaning of "in Anticipation of Litigation"
The phrase "in anticipation of litigation" under Rule 26(b)(3), and
what determines whether documents or materials are prepared in
anticipation of litigation, is the crux of the issue addressed in Textron.76
Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1946), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947))); SPAHN, supra note 63, at
423 (stating that despite its refusal to adopt a 1946 amendment by the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee that would provide protection for "any writing" prepared "in
anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial," a year later the Court first articulated the
attorney work product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor).
72. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 423, 427 (stating that after rejecting attempts by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee in both 1946 and 1955 to codify the doctrine, the
Supreme Court eventually did so).
73. See EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 793 ("Hickman continues to be the standard by
which courts interpret [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)] and protect work product
when those provisions do not apply.").
74. See id. at 793–95 (summarizing Hickman and the important propositions
established in the Court’s decision).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) ("Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)."). Rule 26, not Hickman, expanded the attorney work product
doctrine to protect the work of non-attorneys as well. The doctrine is now referred to as the
work product doctrine as well as the attorney work product doctrine. See SPAHN, supra note
63, at 429 ("Using the term ‘attorney’ when describing the doctrine is not so much incorrect
as it is incomplete, because non-lawyers may also create protected work product. . . . [T]he
term ‘attorney-work product’ identifies [only] a subset of protected work product."
(emphasis omitted)).
76. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 22 (framing the issue as whether "the attorney work
product doctrine shields from an IRS summons ‘tax accrual work papers’ prepared by
lawyers and others in Textron’s Tax Department to support Textron’s calculation of tax
reserves for audited corporate financial statements").

1988

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2011)

This is not an unusual occurrence, however, because this phrase has been
the subject of many disputes.77 "Because the phrase ‘in anticipation of
litigation’ ‘eludes precise definition,’ there are ‘a variety of approaches and
conflicting decisions in the case law.’"78 Although the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not provide much guidance,79 the general consensus is
that whether work product was produced in anticipation of litigation
requires an inquiry into (1) the temporality of the threatened litigation and
(2) the motivation behind the creation of the documents or materials.80
These are commonly referred to as the temporal and motivational
components of "in anticipation of litigation."81
1. The Temporal Component
The temporal component determines when the document was created,
mainly whether it was created before or during litigation. Courts generally
accept that "[t]o receive work product protection for a document, an
applicant must demonstrate not only a subjective belief that litigation was
likely at the time of the document’s creation, but also that the belief was
objectively reasonable."82 However, courts have varied interpretations of
what constitutes "litigation"83 and what constitutes "anticipation of
77. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970) ("Some of
the most controversial and vexing problems to emerge from the discovery rules have arisen
out of requests for the production of documents or things prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial.").
78. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 784, 790 (2006) (quoting
Harper v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655, 659 (S.D. Ind. 1991)).
79. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970) ("The
existing rules make no explicit provision for [materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation].").
80. See Marks, supra note 62, at 14 (referring to the dual inquiry generally applied by
courts to determine whether work product is prepared in anticipation of litigation).
81. See EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 836 (discussing the temporal and motivational
concepts of "in anticipation of litigation").
82. Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 880.
83. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 459–66 (providing a list of what constitutes
"litigation" for purposes of the work product doctrine, including judicial as well non-judicial
proceedings, such as adversarial administrative hearings). Spahn also addresses the complex
debate over whether government investigations are litigation. See id. at 465–66. Although a
government investigation alone may not qualify as litigation, knowledge of or the
commencement of a government investigation can justify a corporation to reasonably
anticipate later litigation. See id. (providing what triggers a reasonable belief that litigation
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litigation."84 More specifically, courts have both accepted and rejected the
argument that notice of an IRS audit is a triggering event for anticipating
litigation.85 These varied opinions expose the complexities of applying the
work product doctrine to situations involving an IRS audit and the common
misconceptions about what an IRS audit entails.86 The temporal component
was a secondary issue in Textron,87 but it is important to consider when
determining whether litigation is actually anticipated at the creation of a
company’s tax accrual workpapers.88
However, the motivational
component—whether that document or material was prepared for litigation
and not some other purpose89—and what test should be applied to
determine whether the motivational component is satisfied90 are at issue in
Textron.91

is anticipated in a government investigation context).
84. See id. at 468–70 (providing a list of the different interpretations of "anticipation
of litigation," including "litigation is imminent" and "there is a substantial and significant
threat of litigation"); Marks, supra note 62, at 14 ("Courts . . . vary on the level of
temporality they will require, with some courts requiring a very high level of imminence
while others seem content with a much lesser degree.").
85. See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 76 F. Supp. 2d 222, 227 (D. Conn. 1999)
(stating that although the notice of an IRS audit would justify the anticipation of litigation,
the conversation at issue was not protected by the work product doctrine because it occurred
in connection with a proposed investment, not a potential lawsuit); see also United States v.
Tel. & Data Sys., Inc., 02-C-0030-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15510, at *9–10 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (stating that documents prepared in response to an IRS audit are not protected by the
work product doctrine, because they are prepared for a potential IRS administrative
proceeding, not litigation).
86. See infra Part VI.C (arguing why an IRS audit and subsequent administrative
proceedings are not litigation for purposes of the work product doctrine).
87. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (referencing the temporality requirement, vaguely, in the majority’s analysis).
88. See infra Part VI.B (arguing that tax accrual workpapers fail to satisfy the
temporal component of "in anticipation of litigation").
89. See EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 793–95 (discussing both the temporal and
motivational components of "anticipation of litigation").
90. See infra Part III.B (providing the tests applied in the respective federal circuit
courts to determine whether the motivational prong is satisfied).
91. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (discussing the different tests applied by circuits to
determine whether the motivational component is satisfied); see also Lischer, supra note 57,
at 547 n.168 (stating that the temporal and motivational components are separate yet
interrelated tests, but the motivational component determines whether the work product
doctrine will apply).
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2. The Motivational Component

The motivational component of "in anticipation of litigation" asks
whether a document’s creation is motivated by litigation.92 Documents or
materials have the potential to be created for multiple purposes, which
causes uncertainty about when the motivational component is satisfied.93 A
court must make a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the document is
created for litigation purposes, and (2) whether the document’s creation is
driven by dual or multiple purposes.94 Depending on what test is applied by
the court, the work product doctrine’s protection of dual-purpose
documents may vary.95 However, it is universally accepted that materials
created in the ordinary course of business—that would otherwise have been
created in "essentially similar form irrespective of litigation"—are not
protected.96
B. The Motivational Component Circuit Split
The potential for documents and materials to serve multiple purposes
has led to a circuit split over which test should be applied to determine
whether a document is created "in anticipation of litigation."97 The Fifth
Circuit applies the "primary purpose" test,98 but the overwhelming majority
92. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 484–85 (introducing the motivational element and
describing its meaning).
93. See id. at 485 ("Courts have debated whether a document must have been created
exclusively because of the litigation or whether the doctrine can also protect documents
created for multiple purposes.").
94. See id. at 486–89 (discussing the varying scopes of the work product doctrine
applied by courts who differ in opinion as to whether documents or materials at issue must
be created in anticipation litigation exclusively, primarily, or to some other degree).
95. See infra Part III.B (discussing the test applied by circuit courts to determine
whether a document is prepared "in anticipation of litigation"); see also Sullivan, supra note
27 ("Dual-purpose documents . . . which may be prepared because of litigation but also serve
a business purpose, may be treated differently depending on which test the court applies.").
96. Maine v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002); see also
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) ("Materials assembled in
the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or
for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by [Rule
26(b)(3)].").
97. See Marks, supra note 62, at 16 (discussing the circuit split over what degree of
the motivation to create a document or materials constitutes in anticipation of litigation).
98. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the
primary motivating purpose test to determine whether El Paso’s tax pool analysis is
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of the remaining circuits—including the First Circuit99—apply the "because
of" test.100 Much of the controversy surrounding Textron concerns whether
the First Circuit applied the "because of" test or established a new "for use"
test without overruling precedent.101 For purposes of determining what test
the First Circuit applied in Textron, it is important to understand how the
"primary purpose" and "because of" tests are applied by courts in cases
similar to Textron.
1. The "Primary Purpose Test" and El Paso
The primary purpose test requires a court to determine the primary
motivating purpose behind the creation of a document.102 "If the primary
protected by the work product doctrine).
99. See Maine, 298 F.3d at 73 (stating that the Department of Interior failed to
establish that either the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege applied to the
documents, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting their
disclosure).
100. See United States v. Torf (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir.
2003) ("We join a growing number of our sister circuits in employing the formulation of the
‘because of’ standard articulated in the Wright & Miller Federal Practice Treatise.");
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2002) ("In order to
protect work product, the party seeking protection must show that the materials were
prepared in anticipation of litigation, i.e., because of the prospect of litigation." (citing Binks
Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1983)); Maine, 298
F.3d at 68 (adopting the use of the "because of" test); Montgomery Cnty. v. MicroVote
Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the Third Circuit defines documents as
being prepared "in anticipation of litigation" when "the document can be fairly said to have
been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation" (quoting In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979))); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (providing that the test to
determine whether the work product doctrine applies is the "because of" test); United States
v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the "because of" test is more
consistent with the literal terms and the proposes of Rule 26 and adopting it over the
"primary purpose" test); Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976–77 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that the "because of" test is applied in the Seventh Circuit).
101. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
affirms that the "because of" test is the correct test to apply in the First Circuit, but applies a
newly created "for use" test).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1985) (applying the primary purpose test to determine whether documents, which were
financial reports prepared by company auditors to satisfy federal securities laws, are
protected by the work product doctrine); see also United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028,
1040 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We conclude that litigation need not necessarily be imminent, as
some courts have suggested . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the
creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation." (citations omitted)).
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motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in
pending or impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys
work product immunity is not mandated."103 Most courts, when applying
this test, primarily consider what motivated the document’s creation.104
Others apply the test narrowly by looking at how the document is used.105
Under both interpretations, materials created in the ordinary course of
business or for other nonlitigation purposes are not protected.106 Most
circuits have rejected this test and adopted the broader "because of" test, but
it remains the applicable test in the Fifth Circuit.107 The Fifth Circuit
addressed whether a corporation’s tax accrual workpapers deserve work
product protection under the "primary purpose" test in United States v. El
Paso Co.108
In El Paso, the IRS petitioned the district court to enforce a summons
against El Paso Natural Gas Company after El Paso refused a document
request made during a routine audit of the company’s 1976–1978 tax
cycles.109 After the district court ruled that El Paso must comply with the
IRS summons, the Fifth Circuit granted the company’s stay motion to
review the case.110 The court referred to the documents at issue as "the tax
pool analysis" but states in its opinion that such a term is synonymous to
tax accrual workpapers.111 After holding that El Paso breached the
103. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d at 296.
104. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 489 (stating that the primary motivating purpose test
can be used to determine "what motivated the document’s creation, regardless of how the
document will be used").
105. See id. (stating that courts may also apply the test in a narrower sense by looking
at whether the document will be used in litigation).
106. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) ("Materials
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided
by [Rule 26(b)(3)].").
107. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
the applicable test in the Fifth Circuit is the "primary purpose" test).
108. See id. at 545 (concluding that the El Paso’s tax pool analysis documents and
supporting memoranda are not shielded by the attorney-client privilege or work product
doctrine, that public policy reflected in security laws did not demand denial of the summons,
and affirming the lower court’s enforcement of the IRS summons).
109. Id. at 533.
110. Id.
111. See id. ("This appeal is centrally concerned with documents known to the
accounting profession under various names—the noncurrent tax account, the tax accrual
work papers, and the tax pool analysis. . . . No matter what alias is used, however, the
documents are of similar nature.").
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confidentiality required to apply the attorney-client privilege, the court then
addressed the applicability of the work product doctrine.112
The court concluded that even if El Paso’s tax pool analysis otherwise
qualified for work product protection, it would still not qualify under the "in
anticipation of litigation" requirement.113 Applying the "primary purpose"
test, the court concluded that the tax pool analysis was intended to bring its
financial books into compliance with GAAP and securities laws.114 "[T]he
primary motivation is to anticipate, for financial purposes, what the impact
of litigation might be on the company’s tax liability. El Paso thus creates
the tax pool analysis with an eye on its business needs, and not its legal
ones."115 The court also noted that no evidence corroborated the use of the
tax pool analysis documents by either outside counsel or El Paso’s
attorneys to prepare for litigation.116 The documents were used only to
"concoct[] theories about the result of possible litigation" and "back up a
figure on a balance sheet," which made them carry "much more the aura of
daily business" than "courtroom combat."117
El Paso argued that the IRS summons should not be permitted on
public policy grounds, claiming that it would discourage companies from
providing the full and frank disclosure of financial information sought by
securities laws.118 The court responded by stating, "We are unwilling to
make inroads in the plainly announced congressional policy to allow the
IRS broad access to relevant, nonprivileged documents on the basis of El
Paso’s claim of a conflict with the policies underlying the securities
laws."119 The court did not share El Paso’s concern that disclosure of these
documents would discourage compliance with securities laws, pointing out
that accountants would be legally obligated to deny certification of a
112. Id. at 542.
113. See id. (conceding that determining whether a document is prepared in anticipation
of litigation is a "slippery task," but concluding that El Paso’s tax pool analysis was not
protected).
114. See id. at 543 (arguing that the purpose of the tax pool analysis documents was
primarily for conformity with GAAP and the desire to please accountants was compelled by
securities laws).
115. Id.
116. See id. (stating that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that the tax pool analysis
or underlying memoranda are referred to outside counsel or used by El Paso’s attorneys to
prepare for trial").
117. Id. at 544.
118. See id. ("The main premise of El Paso’s argument is that the accuracy of financial
reports will suffer if companies must divulge their tax pool analyses to the IRS.").
119. Id.
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company’s financial records without the necessary information.120 "By
upholding the IRS’[s] authority to reach the tax pool analysis, we do not
unleash the inquisition. The tax pool analysis may be useful to the IRS as a
‘roadmap’ through the company’s tax return; it is not, however, an
admission of guilt."121
Although the El Paso court applied a different test than the test(s) at
issue in Textron, it offers arguments similar to the majority in Textron. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the workpapers were created in the ordinary
course of business, primarily used for business purposes, and contained
analysis that is "only a means to a business end."122 The court emphasized
that the IRS only makes the request for workpapers in limited
circumstances, due to the sensitivities of making such requests, and that
Congress’s grant of broad summons powers to the IRS supports their
disclosure.123 These arguments resurface in the Textron opinion and are
persuasive—even when applying the broader "because of" test.124 El Paso,
along with Textron, supports the assertion that regardless of the test applied
by courts, a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers should not be
protected under the work product doctrine from an IRS summons.125
2. The "Because of" Test and Adlman
The "because of" test considers documents to be prepared in
anticipation of litigation if "in light of the nature of the document and the
factual situation in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to
have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation."126 It
is a broader interpretation of the work product doctrine’s scope than the
"primary purpose" test, and it extends work product protection to materials
created for dual purposes.127 Although it is a broader test than the "primary
120. See id. (stating that El Paso’s theory of noncompliance is speculative and
presumes that "corporations will dishonor their legal obligations by discontinuing the
preparation of tax pool analysis").
121. Id. at 545.
122. Id. at 543.
123. See id. at 544–45 (addressing the public policy issues raised by El Paso).
124. See infra Part IV.A (providing that majority’s analysis in Textron).
125. See infra Part VI (arguing that regardless of the test applied by a court, a public
corporation’s tax accrual work papers should not receive work product protection).
126. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024 (2010).
127. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 499 ("Some courts take a narrow view of the work
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purpose" test, it does not extend to materials prepared in the ordinary course
of business or that would have been created in a similar fashion irrespective
of the potential for litigation.128
Whether the work product doctrine will protect a public corporation’s
tax accrual workpapers under the "because of" test has been addressed only
by the First Circuit.129 However, the Second Circuit applied the "because
of" test in United States v. Adlman.130 The dissenting opinion in Textron
referenced Adlman’s application of the "because of" test as support, and
considered its articulation "fatal" to the majority opinion’s analysis.131
In Adlman, Sequa Corporation contemplated merging two of its
subsidiaries, which would produce a significant loss and a tax refund that
the IRS would likely challenge.132 At the request of Sequa, an employee of
Arthur Anderson & Co. produced a fifty-eight-page memorandum, which
included (1) an analysis of likely IRS challenges to the restructuring and tax
refund, (2) a discussion of the applicable laws and prior judicial and IRS
rulings, (3) suggested legal theories, strategies, and methods of structuring
the transaction, and (4) predictions about the likely outcome of litigation.133
Sequa completed the merger, reported a loss on the restructuring, and
subsequently sued the IRS for a refund.134 The IRS then audited Sequa for
its 1986–1989 tax returns and issued a summons for the memorandum,
which Sequa claimed to be protected work product.135
product doctrine and protect only those documents that will be used in the litigation. The
‘because of’ test is a dramatically different and broader interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3)."); id.
at 501–02 (stating that the "because of" test has been interpreted by courts to cover materials
serving dual purposes or motivations).
128. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
scope and applicability of the "because of" test).
129. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (stating that only two circuits have addressed work product protection for tax
accrual workpapers, citing El Paso as the only other case squarely addressing the issue,
which applied the "primary purpose" test).
130. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1204–05 (finding that the district court’s enforcement of
an IRS summons is vacated and remanded for consideration of the documents at issue under
the "because of" test).
131. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 31–36 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (referencing the court’s
analysis in Adlman to support its contention of the majority opinion).
132. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
133. Id.
134. See id. ("The reorganization resulted in a $289 million loss. Sequa claimed the
loss on it 1989 return and carried it back to offset 1986 capital gain, thereby generating a
claim for a refund of $35 million.").
135. Id. at 1195–96.
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The IRS brought a claim in district court to enforce the subpoena.136
The court rejected Sequa’s claims of attorney-client privilege and work
product privilege, and granted the IRS petition to enforce the summons.137
On Sequa’s initial appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s
judgment for applying the wrong standard and remanded the case.138 In
response, the district court again concluded that the memorandum was not
prepared in anticipation of litigation.139 On second appeal, the Second
Circuit phrased the issue as "whether Rule 26(b)(3) is inapplicable to a
litigation analysis prepared by a party or its representative in order to
inform a business decision which turns on the party’s assessment of the
likely outcome of litigation expected to result from the transaction."140
The Second Circuit discussed the application of both the "primary
purpose" test and the "because of" test.141 It denied adoption of the
"primary purpose" test, arguing that "[n]owhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state
that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation
in order to constitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to
aid in litigation."142 Fearing that a company would have to either decline
preparing such material—and make ill-informed decisions in the process—
or suffer prejudice to its litigation prospects, the court reasoned that the
result of applying the "primary purpose" test was inconsistent with the
doctrine’s purpose.143 Adopting the "because of" test, the court stated that
"[w]here a document is created because of the prospect of litigation,
analyzing the likely outcome of that litigation, it does not lose protection
under this formulation merely because it is created in order to assist with a
136. Id. at 1196.
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated by
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is no rule that bars
application of work product protection to documents created prior to the vent giving rise to
litigation. . . . In many instances, the expected litigation is quite concrete, notwithstanding
that the events giving rise to it have not yet occurred."); id. at 1502 ("We conclude that the
district court barred work-product protection on the basis of the incorrect standard. We must
therefore remand for a determination whether the protection of Rule 26(b)(3) should
apply.").
139. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998).
140. Id. at 1197.
141. Id. at 1197–1203.
142. Id. at 1198.
143. Id. at 1200 ("We perceive nothing in the policies underlying the work-product
doctrine or the text of [Rule 26(b)(3)] itself that would justify subjecting a litigant to this
array of undesirable choices.").
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business decision."144 The court noted, as support for its decision, that the
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits already adopted the
"because of" test.145
The court vacated the district court’s enforcement of the IRS summons
and remanded the case to be determined under the "because of" test.146 The
appellate court concluded that the outcome will depend on whether it
"would have been prepared irrespective of the anticipated litigation and
therefore was not prepared because of it."147 It provided a strong inclination
on how the case should be decided: "Where a document is created because
of the prospect of litigation, analyzing the likely outcome of that litigation,
it does not lose protection under this formulation merely because it is
created in order to assist a business decision."148
Besides the dissent’s reliance on Adlman in Textron, the case is
relevant to Textron because the First Circuit cited it when adopting the
"because of" test and establishing it as precedent in Maine v. U.S. Dept. of
the Interior.149 The underlying facts and judgment in Maine are not
relevant to this discussion.150 However, the First Circuit emphasized in
Maine that the "because of" test does not protect documents "‘prepared in
the ordinary course of business or that would have been created in
essentially similar form irrespective of litigation’ . . . even if the documents
aid in the preparation of litigation."151

144. Id. at 1202.
145. Id. at 1203.
146. See id. at 1205 (providing the holding of the court).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1202.
149. See Maine v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding
that the Department of Interior failed to establish that either the work product doctrine or the
attorney-client privilege applied to the documents, and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting their disclosure); id. (stating that the First Circuit agrees with the
formulation of the work product doctrine adopted by the Second Circuit and five other
circuit courts); id .at 73 ("The district court’s standard that a document may not be exempt
under the attorney work-product privilege unless the prospect of litigation ‘served as the
primary motivating factor’ must be rejected.").
150. See id. 63–66 (providing that Maine made a series of Freedom of Information Act
requests to the Department of Interior regarding the decision to list the Atlantic Salmon in
eight Maine rivers as an endangered species, and that the Department of Interior withheld
hundreds of documents by claiming both attorney-client and work product privileges).
151. Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
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3. The Alleged "For Use" Test and Textron

Critics of Textron, including the dissenting judges,152 accused the
majority of creating a new "for use" test and failing to apply precedent
without overruling it.153 Under the alleged "for use" test, documents or
materials only receive work product protection if they are prepared for use
in litigation.154 It narrows the work product doctrine’s scope significantly
more than the "because of" and "primary purpose" tests, and its alleged
application in Textron raised concerns about the doctrine’s stability among
the circuits.155 In fact, whether the First Circuit applied the correct test was
the key issue presented to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.156 To
better understand the Textron outcome and why it is correct, it is important
to discuss the reasoning and analysis provided by both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Textron.157 Doing so will demonstrate that (1) the
dissent raised unlikely concerns, incorrectly applied precedent, and failed to
distinguish Adlman from Textron, and (2) although the majority opinion
admittedly invites these accusations and related criticisms, it ultimately
applied the "because of" test in its analysis—not a narrower "for use" test—
and arrived at the correct outcome under established precedent.158

152. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (Torruella, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority abandons our ‘because of’ of test . . . .
The majority purports to follow this test, but never even cites it. Rather, in its place, the
majority imposes a ‘prepared for’ test . . . ." (citations omitted)).
153. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing examples of the accusation
that the First Circuit applied a new "for use" test even though it affirmed its prior adoption of
the "because of" test).
154. See Kling, supra note 26, at 1718 ("[T]he opinion must be read as an attempt to
eliminate work product protection for documents that are prepared in order to analyze a
company’s litigation prospects for a business purpose rather than for use at trial.").
155. See supra Part III.B.1–2 (discussing the preexisting circuit split over the meaning
of "anticipation of litigation").
156. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d
21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (No. 09-750), 2009 WL 5115221, at *1 (stating that the question
presented is "[w]hether the work-product privilege in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3), which protects documents that are ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial,’ is limited to documents that are prepared for use in litigation").
157. See Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320, 3320 (2010)
("Petition for writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
denied.").
158. See infra Part V.B (arguing that although the majority’s argument is partially
flawed, it did apply the correct test and decided the case appropriately under that test).
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IV. United States v. Textron
In Textron, the IRS audited the corporation for its tax liability during
the tax years 1998–2001.159 Textron, a major aerospace and defense
conglomerate that is commonly audited by the IRS,160 listed nine
transactions in its 2001 return that the IRS believed to be "sale-in, lease
out" (SILO) transactions.161 SILO transactions are included on the list of
tax avoidance transactions referred to under 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).162
The IRS requested Textron’s tax accrual workpapers for years 1998–
2001,163 which consisted of (1) a spreadsheet containing items that may be
challenged by the IRS, the likelihood of liability if audited, and dollar
amounts measuring the appropriate tax reserve for each item, and
(2) backup workpapers consisting of earlier drafts of the spreadsheet, as
well as notes and legal opinions written by Textron’s in-house counsel.164
For some items, the probability of having to pay additional taxes was listed
as 100%.165 Textron provided the final spreadsheet to Ernst & Young, its
outside audit accountant, to corroborate the adequacy and reasonableness of
the corporation’s financial statements.166
Textron refused to disclose the tax accrual workpapers, presumably
because revealing them would make the corporation vulnerable to the IRS’s

159. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
160. See id. ("Textron, Inc. is a publicly traded conglomerate with approximately 190
subsidiaries. . . . Like other large corporations, Textron’s federal tax returns are audited
periodically at which time the IRS examines the returns for the tax years that are part of the
audit cycle.").
161. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc) ("In each of the nine instances, Textron Financial had purchased equipment from a
foreign utility or transit operator and leased it back to the seller on the same day.").
162. See Internal Revenue Serv., Notice 2005-13: Tax-Exempt Leasing Involving
Defeasance, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=135286,00.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2011) ("This notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that these transactions are
tax avoidance transactions and identifies these transactions, and substantially similar
transactions, as listed transactions for purposes of § 1.6011-4(b)(2) of the Income Tax
Regulations and §§ 6111 and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
164. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 24.
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requests for additional taxes.167 In response to Textron’s refusal, the IRS
issued an administrative summons under 26 U.S.C. § 7602.168 The
summons requested all of Textron’s tax accrual workpapers for the tax
years in question.169 When Textron again refused, the IRS brought an
enforcement action against Textron under 26 U.S.C. § 2604 in district
court.170
Textron argued that the IRS summons was not issued for a legitimate
purpose and that tax accrual workpapers are privileged materials.171
Textron alleged that the purpose for preparing the workpapers was to
confirm that it was "adequately reserved with respect to any potential
disputes or litigation that would happen in the future."172 The district court
first concluded that ascertaining the correctness of the tax returns filed by
the taxpayer was a prima facie showing of a legitimate purpose and that
Textron provided insufficient evidence to show bad faith.173 The district
167. See Barsky et al., supra note 26, at 232 ("Revelation of these documents presented
a significant concern for Textron. . . . [T]he IRS would be able to immediately identify
Textron’s vulnerabilities and the specific amounts Textron should be willing to pay to settle
each tax matter.").
168. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2006) ("The Secretary is authorized (1) [t]o examine any
books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant material to such inquiry . . . .");
see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984) ("In order to
encourage effective tax investigations, Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive
information gathering authority; § 7602 is the centerpiece of that congressional design.").
169. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 ("[W]here [as in Textron’s case] the taxpayer claims
benefits from multiple listed transactions, the IRS seeks all of the workpapers for the tax
year in question." (citations omitted)); see also Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial
Audit Workpapers: Announcement 2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue
Serv., Wash., D.C.), July 8, 2002, at 72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb0227.pdf ("[I]f the Service determines that tax benefits from multiple investments in Listed
Transactions are claimed on a return, regardless of whether the Listed Transactions were
disclosed, the Service, as a discretionary matter, will request all Tax Accrual Workpapers.").
170. See 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006) ("If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to . . . produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district
court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel such . . . production . . . ."); see also United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964) (declaring that the IRS "must show that the investigation will be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed . . . .").
171. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142–43 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
172. Id. at 143.
173. See id. at 144–45 (discussing whether the IRS summons of Textron’s tax accrual
workpapers served a legitimate purpose, and concluding that the IRS satisfied its burden of
proof).
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court then addressed each of Textron’s privilege claims, including the
attorney-client privilege, the tax practitioner-client privilege under 26
U.S.C. § 7525,174 and the work product doctrine.175
The district court stated that the attorney-client privilege and the tax
practitioner-client privilege could apply to Textron’s tax accrual
workpapers, but Textron’s disclosure of the workpapers to Ernst & Young
waived its entitlement to either privilege.176 With respect to the work
product doctrine, the district court acknowledged the circuit split over
determining whether a document was prepared in "anticipation of
litigation."177 It asserted that (1) the opinions of Textron’s counsel and
accountants regarding items that may be challenged by the IRS would not
have been prepared but for the fact that "Textron anticipated the possibility
of litigation with the IRS,"178 (2) Textron’s disclosure to Ernst & Young did
not waive work product protection because it did not "substantially increase
the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information,"179 and
(3) the IRS failed to show a "substantial need"180 for the tax accrual
workpapers.181 Finally, it concluded that the work product doctrine applied
to Textron’s tax accrual workpapers and denied the IRS’s petition of
enforcement.182
174. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (2006) ("[T]he same common law protections of
confidentiality which apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall
also apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax
practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged
communication . . . .").
175. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141, 148–50
(D.R.I. 2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).
176. See id. at 146–48, 151–52 (discussing the application of both the attorney-client
privilege and the tax practitioner-client privilege, and the waiver of both privileges by
disclosing the information to an independent accountant).
177. See id. at 149–50 (acknowledging the existence of both the "because of" test and
the "primary purpose" test, and establishing that the standard within the First Circuit is the
"because of" test).
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id. at 152.
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) ("[M]aterials may be discovered if . . . the party
shows that is has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without
undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.").
181. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) ("[T]he IRS has failed to carry the
burden of demonstrating a ‘substantial need’ for ordinary work product, let alone the
heightened burden applicable to Textron’s tax accrual workpapers, which constitute opinion
work product.").
182. See id. at 155.
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On appeal, a divided First Circuit panel initially upheld the district
court’s decision,183 but the en banc court vacated that decision and granted
the government’s petition for rehearing.184
A. The Majority Opinion
Judge Boudin delivered the majority opinion for the en banc First
Circuit and framed the issue as "whether the attorney work product doctrine
shields from an IRS summons ‘tax accrual work papers’ prepared by
lawyers and others in Textron’s Tax Department to support Textron’s
calculation of tax reserves for its audited corporate financial statements."185
The en banc court concluded, while affirming precedent established in
Maine, that the workpapers at issue were prepared to satisfy regulatory laws
and therefore not protected under the work product doctrine.186 The court
agreed with the IRS that the "immediate motive of Textron in preparing the
tax accrual workpapers was to fix the amount of the tax reserve on
Textron’s books and to obtain a clean financial opinion from its auditor."187
It concluded that the subject matter of the workpapers related to a subject
that might potentially be litigated but that the potential for litigation was too
remote to qualify for work product protection.188
The majority briefly discussed public policy concerns underlying its
decision: "Underpaying taxes threatens the essential public interest in
revenue collection. . . . It is because the collection of revenues is essential
to government that administrative discovery, along with many other
comparative tools, are furnished to the IRS."189 The opinion also noted that
the IRS made the request after finding specific "listed transactions" and

183. See Barsky et al., supra note 26, at 232 ("On an appeal, the district court’s decision
was upheld by a divided panel . . . .").
184. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009)
(en banc).
185. Id. at 22.
186. See id. at 26 ("We now conclude that under our own prior Maine precedent—
which we reaffirm en banc—the Textron work papers were independently required by
statutory and audit requirements and that the work product privilege does not apply.").
187. Id. at 27.
188. See id. at 29 (arguing that the workpapers lacked a connection to potential
litigation).
189. Id. at 31.

THE RIGHT ANSWER TO A BILLION-DOLLAR QUESTION

2003

reinforced the notion that the IRS is sensitive to making such requests and
does so only when it deems necessary.190
In summation, the court concluded that (1) the work product doctrine
is aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not financial statements,
(2) the workpapers were prepared to gain approval of their financial filings
and established regulations will discourage companies from providing less
information despite knowing that it is not privileged, and (3) the IRS’s
access to such information serves a "legitimate, and important, function of
detecting and disallowing abusive tax shelters."191 Applying Maine to the
facts, the court concluded that the workpapers were prepared in the ordinary
course of business and therefore not entitled to work product protection.192
If the Textron decision provided only those arguments—without any
further rationale—it would have avoided much of the criticism and
confusion it currently faces.193 In response to Textron’s argument that the
workpapers would be useful to the company if litigation did occur, the court
argued that "there is no evidence in this case that the work papers were
prepared for such a use or would in fact serve any useful purpose."194 The
majority further stated that "the focus of work product protection has been
on materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was
underway or merely anticipated."195 It also provided earlier in the opinion
that the district court’s decision to extend work product protection to tax
accrual workpapers did not include a finding that the they were for use in
possible litigation—only that the reserves listed would cover liabilities that
could potentially be litigated.196
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Torruella’s impassioned dissent argued that the majority
(1) quietly rejected circuit precedent, (2) announced a bad rule, and
(3) would have found that the workpapers are protected by the work
190. See id. at 24 (stating that the request was made only after specifically identifying
potential tax-sheltering and abusive transactions).
191. See id. at 31–32 (summarizing the courts findings).
192. See id. at 30 (stating that Maine supports the IRS position in the case).
193. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (presenting some of the criticisms
and concerns concerning the majority opinion’s clarity and accuracy).
194. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.
195. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 27.
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product doctrine if it applied the proper "because of" test.197 The dissent
argued not only that the majority created a "prepared for" or "for use" test,
but that such a test is narrower in scope than even the "primary purpose"
test.198 Relying heavily on Adlman in its reasoning, it stressed that Rule
26(b)(3) does not state that a document must be prepared to aid in
conducting litigation to constitute work product and the "rationales
underlying the work-product doctrine apply to documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation, even if they are not for use at trial."199
The dissent provided many of the criticisms raised by business and
legal scholars regarding the consequences of such a rule on the future
transparency of companies regarding tax compliance.200 First, it accused
the majority of ignoring the consequences of permitting discovery of dualpurpose documents, in order to support the case-specific needs of the IRS
and its reviewing of Textron’s dense, complicated return.201 It argued that
forcing companies to reveal such legal rationale and impressions would
implicate free-riding conduct that the work product doctrine seeks to
remedy and allow the IRS to immediately identify what Textron is willing
to spend in settlement.202 Second, it argued that the rule will open the door
for discovery of information beyond the basic numbers provided in the
workpapers and could compel the disclosure of legal rationale and
impressions—which runs contrary to the purpose of the work product
doctrine.203 Third, it expressed fears that the decision will have "chilling"
197. See id. at 32–43 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (outlining the sections of the dissenting
opinion by argument).
198. See id. at 32 (comparing the scopes of the pre-existing tests to the alleged,
majority-created test).
199. Id. at 34, 36.
200. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing concerns that Textron further
adds to the uncertain application of the work product doctrine at the circuit court level); see
also Jung, supra note 17, at 395 ("Thus, while Textron appears to promote transparency—by
giving litigants access to information traditionally protected by the work product doctrine—
the decision actually discourages transparency by disincentivizing companies from
communicating freely with their independent auditors."); Kling, supra note 26, at 1726
("The court’s holding [in Textron] will likely chill the socially valuable preparation of such
[legal] analyses in connection with business transactions and may reduce the accuracy of
public companies’ financial statements."); Sullivan, supra note 27 ("The vast majority of inhouse counsel finds that work product protection facilitates their work and believes that
disclosure would cause employees to hesitate to assist them in preparing for litigation.").
201. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
making a results-oriented decision).
202. See id. (claiming that the majority opinion fails to properly consider the negative
effect of disclosing such materials).
203. See id. (expressing concerns about the disclosure of opinion work product).
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consequences that the majority failed to consider and, counter-intuitively,
promotes less transparency and disclosure by public companies.204
The dissent provided its opinion of how the "because of" test should be
applied with respect to the tax accrual workpapers. It criticized the majority
for failing to acknowledge that an IRS audit can be litigation because
although the initial stages of a tax audit may not be adversarial, "the
disputes themselves are essentially adversarial" and "the subject of these
disputes will become the subject of litigation unless the dispute is
resolved."205 It restated the district court’s argument that there would be no
need to estimate the account reserve for tax contingent liabilities without
anticipation of litigation.206 In response to the "ordinary course of business"
exception provided in Rule 26’s Advisory Committee Notes,207 the dissent
attempted to show that the workpapers were dual-purpose documents.208 It
claimed that "the best reading of the advisory committee’s notes is simply
that preparation for business or for public requirements is preparation for a
nonlitigation purpose. . . . [B]ut [it] does not suggest that the presence of
such a purpose should somehow override a litigation purpose, should one
exist."209
To support its assertions, the dissent framed the workpapers’
characteristics as materials that anticipate the likelihood that litigation over
specific tax items will result in Textron having to pay the IRS additional
taxes.210 "That Textron will not ultimately litigate each position does not
change the fact that when it prepared the documents, Textron was acting to
anticipate and analyze the consequences of possible litigation . . . ."211 It
finally concluded that the documents would not be the same "at all" but for

204. See id. at 37–38 ("[T]he majority’s new rule will have ramifications that will affect
the form and detail of documents attorneys prepare when working to convince auditors of
the soundness of a corporation’s reserves. . . . Nearly every major business decision by a
public company has a legal dimension that will require such analysis.").
205. Id. at 40.
206. See id. at 40–41 (providing arguments for how the "because of" test should apply
to the workpapers at issue).
207. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (stating the "ordinary course of
business" exception to the work product doctrine).
208. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 42 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (discussing the "ordinary
course of business" exception and arguing that it should not apply to Textron’s tax accrual
workpapers).
209. Id.
210. See id. (agreeing with Textron’s interpretation of its tax accrual workpapers).
211. Id.
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the anticipated litigation and were not prepared regardless of the prospect of
litigation.212
V. Analysis of the Textron Opinion
A. The Dissent Reached the Wrong Decision
1. The Dissent Failed to Raise Legitimate Concerns
The criticisms and concerns raised by the dissent and echoed by
Textron’s critics carry little weight. First, the court’s decision to deny work
product protection does not implicate free-riding conduct.213 The request
for workpapers is made only in extraordinary circumstances.214 They are
considered to be outside the scope of a standard examination and are not
requested absent unusual circumstances.215 The IRS has acknowledged the
sensitivity of workpapers requests and exercises its authority to request
them with considerable restraint.216 In Textron, the request was made only
after finding multiple potential tax-sheltering transactions217 in Textron’s

212. Id.
213. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (providing the arguments raised by the
dissent and critics of the Textron decision).
214. See Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers:
Announcement 2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.),
July 8, 2002, at 72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf ("The Service
will continue in its current policy of requesting Tax Accrual Workpapers only in unusual
circumstances . . . .").
215. See Claudine Pease-Wingenter, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Tax Accrual Workpapers: The Real Legacy of Textron, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 337, 341
(2008) (emphasizing that the request for tax accrual workpapers is unique).
216. See Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers:
Announcement 2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.),
July 8, 2002, at 72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf ("Despite the
broad scope of authority recognized by the Supreme Court, the Service has historically acted
with restraint, declining to request Tax Accrual Workpapers as a standard examination
technique.").
217. See Internal Revenue Serv., Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions—LB&I
Tier I Issues in Alphabetical Order, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/
article/0,,id=204155,00.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2011) (listing tax-sheltering transactions
in alphabetical order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The list of
transactions that the IRS has determined to be tax avoidance transactions is limited to
roughly forty types of transactions, which places further restraint on the request for a
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers. Id.
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return—which is stated as grounds for such a request.218 The IRS
recognizes the potential detriment such requests could have on the auditorclient relationship and continues to follow its policy of restraint.219 Such
requests are made to shorten the disclosure gap and aid "the Service in
focusing its examination resources on returns that contain specific uncertain
tax positions that are of particular interest or of sufficient magnitude to
warrant Service inquiry, as well as allowing examination teams to identify
all of the issues underlying the tax returns more quickly and efficiently."220
It is doubtful that the request and use of workpapers—in limited
circumstances to collect appropriate taxes from corporations—qualifies as
free-riding conduct that the work product doctrine seeks to prevent.
Second, the potential for disclosure of legal rationale and impressions
related to the production of tax accrual workpapers is possible, but it is
unlikely to reveal any protected information under the work product
doctrine.221 Although the district court asserted that the workpapers were in
fact opinion work product,222 that argument was not raised by the First
218. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 23 (stating that the IRS determined Textron engaged in
nine SILO transactions, that are listed as potential tax-sheltering tactics and often evidence
taxpayer abuse); see also Request for Tax Accrual and Other Financial Audit Workpapers:
Announcement 2002-63, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.),
July 8, 2002, at 72, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-27.pdf ("[I]f the
Service determines that tax benefits from multiple investments in Listed Transactions are
claimed on a return, regardless of whether the Listed Transactions are claimed on a return,
regardless of whether the Listed Transactions were disclosed, the Service, as a discretionary
matter, will request all Tax Accrual Workpapers.").
219. See Pease-Wingenter, supra note 215, at 341 (discussing the policy history of IRS
requests for tax accrual workpapers); see also Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner
Doug Shulman to New York Bar Association Taxation Section, Annual Meeting in New
York City, Jan. 26, 2010 (stating that although the IRS is promoting greater transparency to
ensure certainty, consistency, and efficiency, it would still abide by its longstanding policy
of restraint in making tax accrual workpapers requests); Uncertain Tax Positions—Policy of
Restraint: Announcement 2010-09, INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv.,
Wash., D.C.), Feb. 16, 2010, at 409, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb1007.pdf ("[T]he Service intends to retain the existing policy of restraint for requesting tax
accrual workpapers during the course of examinations . . . . The Service will continue to
review the policy and to consider additional modifications . . . to ensure it obtains complete
and accurate information regarding a taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions . . . .").
220. Uncertain Tax Positions—Policy of Restraint: Announcement 2010-09, INTERNAL
REVENUE BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 16, 2010, at 409, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb10-07.pdf.
221. See supra notes 204 and accompanying text (providing the arguments that
disclosure of tax accrual workpapers will lead to the discovery of legal rationale and
impressions otherwise protected by the work product doctrine).
222. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that Textron’s tax accrual workpapers
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Circuit in either the majority or dissent.223 It remains to be seen whether the
Textron ruling permitted the disclosure of legal rationale or impressions, or
potentially opens the door for their disclosure in the future. Assuming that
Textron leads to disclosure of legal rationale and impressions related to the
workpapers, it is unlikely that those impressions would fall within the scope
of opinion work product. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(B)
protects legal rationale and impressions under opinion work product, but
only if they concern litigation.224 The workpapers themselves are not
prepared in "anticipation of litigation,"225 so any related legal rationale or
impressions are therefore unlikely to concern litigation.226 Thus, the
disclosure of these legal rationale or impressions falls outside the scope of
opinion work product protection.
Third, the potential for chilling disclosure and transparency is
unlikely227 given the role and obligations of independent auditors to certify
a company’s financial statements.228 The main independent auditors,
including Ernst & Young, are sophisticated entities that have legal
obligations of their own to follow when certifying financial statements.229
If Textron did chill public corporations’ willingness to disclose relevant
information, that effect would merely place a greater burden on auditors to
ferret out the details of a company’s financial statements. Such a burden
shift is not cause for concern.230 The Supreme Court has stated the
constituted opinion work product, and therefore were subject to a higher standard of
protection under the work product doctrine).
223. See generally United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.
2009) (en banc).
224. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) ("If the court orders discovery of those materials
[prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial], it must protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.").
225. See infra Part VI.B–C (arguing why a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers
are not prepared "in anticipation of litigation").
226. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 555 (stating that the opinion information related to
the tax accrual workpapers cannot concern litigation if the workpapers were not prepared in
anticipation of litigation).
227. See supra notes 204 and accompanying text (arguing that discovery of tax accrual
workpapers will have a chilling effect on transparency and disclosure by public
corporations).
228. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 541 (noting that independent auditors will not
certify a taxpayer’s financial statements if the taxpayer provides insufficient information).
229. See United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 818–19 (1984) (stating that
auditors are obligated to acquire all relevant information prior to certifying a company’s
financial statements).
230. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 540 ("Accordingly, tension—probably a healthy
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importance of the independent auditor’s role in certifying a public
company’s financial statements:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client. . . . This
"public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity
to the public trust. . . . [T]he independent certified public accountant
cannot be content with the corporation’s representations that its tax
accrual reserves are adequate; the auditor is ethically and professionally
obligated to ascertain for himself as far as possible whether the
corporation’s contingent tax liabilities have been accurately stated. If
the auditor were convinced that the scope of the examination had been
limited by management’s reluctance to disclose matters relating to the
tax accrual reserves, the auditor would be unable to issue an unqualified
opinion as to the accuracy of the corporation’s financial statements.
Instead the auditor would be required to issue a qualified opinion, an
adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion, thereby notifying the
investing public of possible potential problems inherent in the
231
corporation’s financial reports.

Even if the reaction to Textron was a trend towards revealing as little
information as possible to an auditor to receive certification, the auditor
would still, in its gatekeeping role, be obligated to demand enough
information to provide a qualified opinion.232 If enough information were
not provided, the auditor has ample incentive to either demand more or
refuse to certify the company’s financial statements.233 Either way, the risk
tension—would exist between the tax payer and [the certified public accountant] because of
the [certified public accountant’s] obligation of independence . . . ."). There is the possibility
that the relationship between an outside auditor and the taxpayer crosses the adversarial
threshold, and this disclosure of documents to the outside accountant is waiver. See United
States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing whether disclosure to
an independent auditor constitutes waiver of work product protection). "Among the district
courts that have addressed this issue, most have found no waiver." Id. However, that trend
may change depending on how courts view the evolving auditor-taxpayer relationship.
231. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818–19 (citations omitted).
232. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 541 ("Because the [certified public accountant] has
obligations independent of its obligations in favor of its client the taxpayer, the [certified
public accountant] will require adequate-to-the-task disclosure in the tax accrual
workpapers.").
233. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002) (establishing
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate auditors of public
companies and conduct necessary investigations and disciplinary proceedings); Ventry, A
Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 879 ("[I]f a public
corporation failed to generate tax accrual workpapers in any given year, its auditors would
be unable to issue it a bill of financial health . . . , the corporation could be delisted by its
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of chilling disclosure is minimal and does not pose the threat raised by the
dissent and other critics of the Textron opinion.234
2. The Dissent Incorrectly Applied the "Because of" Test
The dissent accused the majority of "straining to craft a rule favorable
to the IRS" when the dissent itself strains to apply the law favorably to
public corporations.235 First, the dissent acknowledged that there are
several steps between an IRS audit notice and settling a disputed tax return
through litigation, but argued that the potential for unresolved disputes to
become adversarial justifies qualifying the workpapers as prepared "in
anticipation of litigation."236 If that is correct, without anything more to
substantiate the likelihood of litigation, then the work product doctrine
would extend indefinitely, regardless of the remoteness of the potential
litigation.237 That leaves the possibility that anything related in subject
matter to the litigation and prepared prior to that litigation is prepared in
anticipation of that litigation and, therefore, qualifies for work product
protection.238 This reasoning stretches the work product doctrine to
exchange, and it would cease to exist as a publicly traded entity.").
234. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1155–58 (2004) (providing that an Audit
Committee of a public company is required to be independent and is responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the company’s auditors). Proponents of the
"chilling" argument also overlook the internal controls provided by a public corporation’s
audit committee. The audit committee has a written charter describing its duties and
responsibilities, which at a minimum must include: (1) obtaining and reviewing a report by
the independent auditor describing the firm’s internal controls, material issues raised by a
variety of sources, steps taken to deal with those issues, and the potential for conflicting
relationships between the independent auditor and the company; and (2) discussing the
company’s annual audited financial statements and quarterly financial statements with
management and the independent auditor. See id. at 1163–66 (offering guidelines set out in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for a public company’s audit committee, and its minimal
requirements). A public corporation’s audit committee will further discourage a decision to
disclose less information to the independent auditor, and serves as another deterrent against
providing insufficient or misleading information to corroborate the company’s financial
statements.
235. Textron, 577 F.3d at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
236. See id. at 40 ("Though the initial stages of a tax audit may not be adversarial, the
disputes themselves are essentially adversarial; the subject of these disputes will become the
subject of litigation unless the dispute is resolved.").
237. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the temporal limitations placed on the scope of
the work product doctrine).
238. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
880 (stating that under this theory, the work product doctrine could extend to any advice,
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illogical lengths and fails to consider the temporal limitations on its
scope.239
Second, the dissent made a strenuous effort to refute the "ordinary
course of business" exception by claiming (1) that the workpapers were
dual-purpose documents, and (2) that documents having a litigation purpose
irrespective of a regulatory or business purpose fall outside the scope of this
exception.240 The major flaw in this argument is that the workpapers are
not dual-purpose documents. They serve no litigation purpose.241 They are
not prepared to assess the likelihood of litigation, but to assess the
likelihood of having to pay further taxes due to positions taken by a public
corporation on its tax return.242 The sole purpose for their preparation, as
the majority stated, is to receive approval of its financial statement from an
independent auditor.243 They only contain content related to the remote
possibility of anticipated litigation.244 The regulatory requirement to have
an auditor certify a company’s financial statements is unrelated to litigation,
the regulatory requirement to pay taxes is several steps removed from
potential litigation, and the workpapers were proven to serve no useful
litigation purposes by the majority.245 Under the current language of Rule
26 as interpreted by the Advisory Committee, Textron’s tax accrual
workpapers fall under the "ordinary course of business exception" and do
not deserve work product protection.246
legal or otherwise, regarding potential litigation, regardless of the likelihood of litigation).
239. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the limitations placed on work product doctrine
by the temporal component of "in anticipation of litigation").
240. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 41–43 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (addressing and
dismissing the "ordinary course of business" exception).
241. See supra notes 186–88, 193 and accompanying text (discussing the majority
opinion’s argument that the workpapers serve no purpose in litigation).
242. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
880 ("[The workpapers] may discuss the prospect of litigation, and they may contain
analyses that might one day become the subject of litigation, but the documents themselves
are not created for litigation purposes.").
243. See supra Part IV.A (providing the majority opinion’s arguments).
244. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
879–80 ("[W]orkpapers contain percentage determinations on the likelihood of success of
prevailing on the merits of specific tax positions. Those determinations themselves are not
prepared in anticipation of litigation, but to evaluate the likelihood of litigation as required
by federal securities law and [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles].").
245. See id. at 880 ("Indeed, without independent financial reporting obligations, most
corporate taxpayers would never create tax accrual workpapers, certainly not for litigation
reasons.").
246. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (presenting the "ordinary course of
business" exception to work product doctrine protection).
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Third, the dissent’s assertion that the documents would not have been
prepared in the same way irrespective of the anticipated litigation is
incorrect.247 A public corporation is required by law to have its financial
statements certified by an outside accountant.248 To do so, it must provide
an explanation for why it has reserve accounts for tax contingent
liabilities.249 Even when a company does not create a reserve account for
its contingent tax liabilities, it must provide an explanation for the absence
of a reserve account on its financial statement.250 In either situation, the
financial statement and explanatory documents provided to the independent
auditor are prepared irrespective of litigation.251 The workpapers discuss
matters that may be litigated, but that does not support the assertion that the
makeup of the workpapers depends on the existence of anticipated
litigation. Their preparation is solely driven by regulatory requirements and
will occur irrespective of litigation involving the listed items. Therefore,
the dissent erroneously found that Textron’s tax accrual workpapers
deserve work product protection under the "because of" test.
3. The Dissent Erroneously Concluded that Adlman Is "Fatal" to the
Majority Opinion
The dissent relied heavily on Adlman’s articulation of the "because of"
test in its analysis and claimed the articulation to be "fatal" to the majority’s
analysis.252 It framed the issue addressed in Adlman as "whether the workproduct doctrine applies where a dual purpose exists for preparing the legal
analysis, that is, where the dual purpose of anticipating litigation and a
247. See supra notes 206–12 and accompanying text (summarizing the dissent’s
application of the "because of" test).
248. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of public
companies to have their annual financial statements audited by an independent accountant).
249. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
879 (stating that the workpapers are an important part of the reporting process because they
help to explain the amount on reserve due to the potential future liability for additional taxes
owed by the company "in the event of an adverse administrative or judicial determination
over tax return positions").
250. See id. ("Public corporations produce tax accrual workpapers even if they do not
anticipate having to set aside a tax reserve. That is because they must justify to their
auditors the absence of a contingent tax reserve.").
251. See id. ("[T]ax accrual workpapers are generated every year in a public
corporation’s ordinary course of business, and they are generated whether or not the
company anticipated specific or potential litigation.").
252. Textron, 577 F.3d at 33 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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business purpose coexist."253 It then argued that the tax accrual workpapers
in Textron, like the memorandum in Adlman, qualified as dual-purpose
documents that fall under work product protection when applying the
"because of" test.254
The dissent neglected to recognize that the document at issue in
Adlman is distinguishable from the tax accrual workpapers at issue in
Textron. There is a clear distinction between documents prepared to make
an informed business decision with respect to potential litigation—the
memorandum at issue in Adlman—and documents prepared in the ordinary
course of business to comply with legal or statutory requirements—the tax
accrual workpapers at issue in Textron.255 Sequa identified a specific
transaction, anticipated that it might lead to litigation with the IRS, and
requested a memorandum about it.256 Therefore, the memorandum was
made for both litigation and business purposes, and qualifies as a dualpurpose document.
Conversely, the purpose of creating Textron’s
workpapers was to receive certification of its financial statement from an
outside auditor without any regard to potential litigation.257 Thus, under the
Second Circuit’s articulation of the "because of" test, a public corporation’s
tax accrual workpapers are unprotected by the work product doctrine
because they would have been prepared "irrespective of the anticipated
litigation and therefore [were] not prepared because of it."258
The dissent also provided one of the examples the Adlman court cited
for choosing to apply the "because of" test rather than the "primary
purpose" test:
[T]he policies underlying the work-product doctrine suggest strongly
that work-product protection should not be denied to a document that
analyzes expected litigation merely because it is prepared to assist an
253. Id.
254. See id. at 38–43 (accusing the majority opinion of ignoring the dual purposes
(litigation and business) underlying the creation of the corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers).
255. Compare United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d, 1194, 1195–96 (2d Cir. 1998)
(describing the reasons for creating the memorandum), with Textron, 577 F.3d at 22–23
(describing the reasons for creating tax accrual workpapers); see also infra Part VI.A
(arguing that tax accrual workpapers fall under the "ordinary course of business" exception).
256. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 527–28 ("The report in controversy in Adlman was
not required for financial accounting purposes, and the report (a ‘litigation analysis’) was
prepared because litigation with the IRS was expected").
257. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 22–23 (providing the reasons for creating tax accrual
workpapers, which does not include any consideration of current or potential litigation).
258. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1205 (2d Cir. 1998).
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business decision. . . . The problem is aptly illustrated by several
hypothetical fact situations likely to recur: . . . (iii) A business entity
prepares financial statements to assist its executives, stockholders,
prospective investors, business partners, and others in evaluating future
courses of action. Financial statements include reserves for projected
litigation. The company’s independent auditor requests a memorandum
prepared by the company’s attorneys estimating the likelihood of
success in litigation and an accompanying analysis of the company’s
legal strategies and options to assist in estimating what should be
reserved for litigation losses. . . . [T]he company involved would
require legal analysis that falls squarely within Hickman’s area of
primary concern—analysis that candidly discusses the attorney’s
litigation strategies, appraisal of likelihood of success, and perhaps the
259
feasibility of reasonable settlement.

The dissent argued that "[t]he majority offers no response to this sound
policy analysis" and instead permits the disclosure of "such dual-purpose
documents, which contain confidential assessments of litigation strategies
and chances."260
The dissent neglected to recognize the distinction between reserves for
litigation liabilities and reserves for tax contingency liabilities. The
example in Adlman does not address tax contingent liabilities—only
memoranda related to litigation liabilities. Although the hypothetical is
similar to the production and use of the tax accrual workpapers, the
probabilities of tax liability are too remote from prospective litigation to be
considered "a document that analyzes expected litigation."261 Whereas, the
Adlman memorandum is prepared with the existence of both a subjective
and objectively reasonable belief that litigation is likely,262 the tax accrual
workpapers at issue in Textron fail to satisfy the temporal component of "in
anticipation of litigation."263 Thus, the example fails to directly implicate
the tax accrual workpapers at issue in Textron, and the dissent’s use of the
example evidences its failure to recognize this distinction.
The dissent’s discussion of Adlman and its articulation of the "because
of" test can hardly be presented as inconsistent with the majority opinion in
Textron, let alone "fatal" to it. However, the dissent is correct that the
259. See id. at 1199–1200.
260. Textron, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
261. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199.
262. See supra Part III.A.1 (providing the elements of the temporal component of "in
anticipation of litigation").
263. See infra Parts VI.B–C (arguing that tax accrual workpapers fail to qualify as
documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation").
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Adlman decision dispels the notion that the "because of" test is limited to
documents prepared "for use" in litigation.264 Admittedly, the "because of"
test does not require documents or materials to be used in litigation to
receive work product protection, and the majority opinion has deservingly
received criticism with respect to this element of its analysis.265 However,
this element is not a key component of the majority’s argument or holding,
and it does not corrupt the majority’s otherwise correct application of the
"because of" test.266 Despite the majority opinion’s erroneous assertion that
documents must be prepared "for use" in litigation to receive work product
protection, it ultimately arrived at the right decision under the "because of"
test.267
B. The Majority Ultimately Reached the Right Decision
1. The Majority’s Analysis Welcomed Criticism and "For Use" Test
Speculation
The majority in Textron admittedly welcomed much of the criticism
and speculation that it created a new "for use" test.268 It first emphasized
that the district court failed to make a finding that the tax accrual
workpapers were prepared "for use" in possible litigation.269 It then
referenced testimony that claimed the tax accrual workpapers were unlikely
to be useful in litigation over any of the positions taken.270 The majority
264. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 34 (stating that "[n]owhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state that a
document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute
work product" (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198–99 (2d Cir. 1998))).
265. See id. at 32 ("[T]he majority imposes a ‘prepared for’ test, asking if the
documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation.’. . . In adopting its test, the majority
ignores a tome of precedents from the circuit courts and contravenes much of the principles
underlying work product doctrine.").
266. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the majority’s opinion was erroneous in some
respects, but ultimately applied the "because of" test correctly, and arrived at the right
decision under the "because of" test).
267. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 29 ("From the outset, the focus of work product
protection has been on materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was
underway or merely anticipated.").
268. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the majority opinion in Textron, and noting the
derivation of "for use" test speculation).
269. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 27 (stating that such a finding would have been
erroneous).
270. See id. at 28 ("To complete the story, we note one suggestion by one Textron
witness that, if litigation did occur, the work papers could be useful to Textron in that
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further stated, "From the outset, the focus of work product protection has
been on materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was
underway or merely anticipated."271 The multiple "for use" references in
the opinion welcomed speculation that the majority did not apply the
"because of" test despite affirming it as precedent.272 Thus, the majority’s
discussion of the workpapers’ usefulness in litigation was the catalyst for
accusations that it created a new "for use" test.273
Despite speculation that the court applied a new test in its analysis,
there is a more likely explanation for the court’s "for use" argument. As
stated, the "because of" test extends work product protection to dualpurpose documents—documents that serve both a litigation and nonlitigation purpose.274 By focusing correctly on the functionality of
Textron’s tax accrual workpapers, the "for use" language is more likely a
poorly worded argument that the workpapers were not actually dualpurpose documents.275 The majority acknowledged that Textron witnesses
made an effort to use the word "litigation" as often as possible, and one
witness even argued that the workpapers would be useful to litigation.276
These references to litigation did not convince the majority that the
workpapers served any purpose other than to "make book entries, prepare
financial statements and obtain a clean audit."277 In response to Textron’s
focus on the content of the workpapers and its relation to potential
litigation, the court emphasized that "it is not enough to trigger work
product protection that the subject matter of a document relates to a subject

litigation. This assertion was not supported by any detailed explanation, was not adopted by
the district judge and is more than dubious . . . ." (citations omitted)).
271. Id. at 29.
272. See id. at 26 (citing the "because of" language in Maine and then concluding that
"under our own prior Maine precedent—which we reaffirm en banc—the Textron work
papers were independently required by statutory and audit requirements and that the work
product privilege does not apply").
273. See supra note 27 and accompanying test (providing arguments made that accuse
the majority of applying a narrower "for use" test).
274. See supra Part III.B.2 (establishing the scope and applicability of the "because of"
test to dual-purpose documents).
275. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 871 ("The key
question is, why were the documents created? The context of document preparation, not the
content of the documents themselves, is what matters. And the context surrounding the
preparation of tax documents, including tax accrual workpapers, has nothing to do with
anticipating litigation.").
276. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 27–28 (discussing the testimony of Textron witnesses).
277. Id. at 27.
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that might conceivably be litigated."278 It concluded this section of its
argument by stating that "a set of tax reserve figures, calculated for purpose
of accurately stating a company’s financial figures, has in ordinary parlance
only that purpose: [T]o support a financial statement and the independent
audit of it."
Although the majority opinion used poor terminology and unclear
logic in the "for use" section of its analysis, it is unlikely that the court
intended to narrow work product protection to documents used in
litigation.279 It was more likely a badly worded attempt to show that the
workpapers served no functional litigation purpose. Interpreting "for use"
more broadly to mean that the workpapers served no litigation purpose—
and therefore are not dual-purpose documents deserving of work product
protection under the "because of" test—is less speculative than the theory
that the First Circuit created a new test. That interpretation reconciles the
"for use" section of the majority’s argument with the affirmation of Maine
and the remainder of the majority opinion, which is otherwise consistent
with the correct application of the "because of" test.
2. The Majority Correctly Applied the "Because of" Test
The primary issue in the petition for writ of certiorari was whether the
First Circuit created a new "for use" test and added another test to the preexisting circuit split.280 Some feel that the decision to deny review creates
uncertainty about what test the First Circuit will apply to determine whether
documents and materials will fall within the scope of work product
protection.281 These concerns, although alleged to be supported by the
court’s rationale in the Textron opinion,282 are unfounded.283 The majority
278. Id. at 29.
279. See id. at 29–30 (interpreting "in anticipation of litigation or for trial" to not mean
documents prepared for some purpose other than litigation, which is consistent with the
dual-purpose element of the "because of" test).
280. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d
21 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (No. 09-750), 2009 WL 5115221, at *1 (stating that the question
presented is "whether the work-product privilege in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3), which protects documents that are ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial,’ is limited to documents that are prepared for use in litigation").
281. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (offering examples of concerns raised in
response to the Textron opinion).
282. See supra Parts IV.A, V.B.1 (discussing the majority’s "for use" argument).
283. See supra Part V.B.1 (reconciling the "for use" section of the majority’s argument
with its affirmation of Maine and the remainder of the opinion).

2018

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2011)

correctly applied the established "because of" test and did not engage in the
creation of a new "for use" test.
The majority opinion acknowledged existing precedent by referencing
the "because of" test language in the Maine opinion, as well as its rejection
of the "primary purpose" test.284 Before providing any analysis or
reasoning for its holding, the court stated that it was reaffirming its prior
Although stating the established precedent and
Maine decision.285
affirming its application in the case at issue does not confirm that the court
did in fact apply the established test in its analysis, doing so would be
inconsistent with the decision to overrule precedent and apply a new test.286
It does, however, leave open the possibility that the court incorrectly
applied precedent in its analysis. The First Circuit admittedly provided
arguments that are unclear and irrelevant to its holding, but the bulk of its
analysis and reasoning corroborate that the "because of" test was correctly
applied in Textron.
The majority considered the workpapers not prepared for litigation, but
acknowledged that they related to a subject that "might or might not
occasion litigation."287 Its discussion of both the purpose and intended use
of the workpapers is admittedly misleading.288 The best explanation for it is
that the court intended to refute the alleged dual-purpose nature of the
workpapers by arguing that they would not be of any use in the litigation
and, therefore, they do not deserve work product protection under the
"because of" test.289 Thus, the workpapers cannot be argued to serve a
litigation purpose—or qualify as dual-purpose documents—if they are of no
use in litigation and are merely related to a subject matter that has the
potential to be litigated, especially when the potential for litigation is
remote at the time of their creation.290
The majority’s primary arguments included that (1) the work product
doctrine is aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not financial
statements, (2) the workpapers were prepared to gain approval of their
284. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (rejecting the "primary purpose" test and affirming the
"because of" test as applied in Maine).
285. Id.
286. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (suggesting that Textron did not apply
the "because of" test despite affirming its adoption).
287. Textron, 577 F.3d at 26.
288. See supra Part V.B.1 (arguing that the majority opinion welcomed criticism).
289. Textron, 577 F.3d at 28.
290. See id. at 29 ("It is not enough to trigger work product protection that the subject
matter of a document relates to a subject that might conceivably be litigated.").
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financial filings, and established regulations will discourage companies
from providing less information despite knowing that it is not privileged
information, and (3) IRS access to such information serves a "legitimate,
and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax
shelters."291 The determining factor in the decision is proof not only that
the majority followed precedent, but also that it reached the right outcome
under the "because of" test:
In Maine, we said that work product protection does not extend to
"documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that
would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of
litigation." . . . Maine applies straightforwardly to Textron’s tax audit
workpapers—which were prepared in the ordinary course of
292
business . . . .

Regardless of whether a court applies the "primary purpose" or "because
of" test in its analysis, there is a universal understanding that the documents
produced in the ordinary course of business will not be protected by the
work product doctrine.293 This interpretation of the "because of" test is
consistent with both Maine and Adlman.294 Thus, the majority’s discussion
of documents and materials prepared in the ordinary course of business
confirms that it properly applied the "because of" test and arrived at the
right decision.295

291. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the rationale behind the majority’s holding).
292. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (citations omitted).
293. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (providing in the Advisory Notes of
Rule 26 that materials produced in the ordinary course of business will not be protected).
294. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (providing that the work product doctrine does not
extend to documents or materials created in the ordinary course of business, regardless of
whether they contain legal opinions); Maine v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the "because of" test does not protect from disclosure documents
that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that would have been created "in
essentially similar fashion regardless of the litigation"); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d
1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[I]t should be emphasized that the "because of" formulation that
we adopt here withholds protection from documents that are prepared in the ordinary course
of business or that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the
litigation. . . ."). The Adlman court added, "Even if such documents might also help in
preparation for litigation, they do not qualify for protection because it could not fairly be
said that they were created ‘because of’ actual or impending litigation." Id. (citations
omitted).
295. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 ("A set of tax reserve figures, calculated for purposes
of accurately stating a company’s financial figures, has in ordinary parlance only that
purpose: [T]o support a financial statement and the independent audit of it.").
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VI. Tax Accrual Workpapers Do Not Deserve Work Product Protection
After Textron, the "because of" and "primary purpose" tests remain the
only tests currently adopted by the circuit courts to determine whether
documents or materials are prepared "in anticipation of litigation."296 El
Paso and Textron establish that, under either test, a public corporation’s tax
accrual workpapers should not receive work product protection from an IRS
summons.297
Regardless of the test applied by courts, a public corporation’s
workpapers should not be protected from an IRS summons. The underlying
reasons for this conclusion are: (1) tax accrual workpapers fall under the
"ordinary course of business" exception, (2) the potential for litigation at
the time of their creation is too remote to be considered "in anticipation of
litigation," (3) an IRS audit and subsequent administrative proceedings do
not constitute "litigation" for work product doctrine purposes, (4) public
policy favors erring on the side of more disclosure to the government when
it involves tax-compliance and preventing tax-sheltering practices, and
(5) the IRS has a substantial need for the information provided in a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers.
A. Tax Accrual Workpapers Are Produced in the Ordinary Course of
Business
Regardless of the test applied by the court, and even if a public
corporation can show that the tax accrual workpapers are prepared in
anticipation of litigation, the work product doctrine will not apply if they
are prepared in the "ordinary course of business."298 Documents or
materials that would have been created "in essentially similar form
irrespective of the litigation"—meaning they would have been created in
the absence of pending or future litigation—fall under the exception and are
not entitled to work product protection.299 The exception also applies to
296. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (providing that the Fifth Circuit
applies the "primary purpose" test and the vast majority of other circuits apply the "because
of" test). Some circuits have not yet addressed what test to apply when determining whether
documents or materials are prepared "in anticipation of litigation."
297. See supra Parts III.B.1, IV (providing the summary and conclusions of El Paso
and Textron).
298. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (providing the "ordinary course of
business" exception to work product protection).
299. Maine v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations

THE RIGHT ANSWER TO A BILLION-DOLLAR QUESTION

2021

dual-purpose documents meeting those characteristics, regardless of
whether they serve a litigation purpose.300
The "ordinary course of business" exception to work product
protection is derived from the Advisory Committee’s explanatory statement
of Rule 26.301 The Rule 26 Notes identify three types of materials that are
not protected: (1) materials assembled in the ordinary course of business,
(2) materials assembled pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, and (3) materials assembled for other nonlitigation purposes.302
"Each of the three categories focuses on the purpose for creation of the
materials, not on the substantive content of the materials . . . ."303 One of
the cases cited as support for this assertion involved materials produced in
compliance with statutory requirements, which led that court to conclude
that they did not deserve work product protection.304 The advisors could
not have predicted the vast expansion of the administrative state since 1970,
but the notes and referenced caselaw indicate that they did consider
materials created for compliance with statutory or regulatory requirements
to fall under the scope of the "ordinary course of business" exception.305
The contents of a corporation’s tax accrual workpapers are only
relevant in the determination of the purpose for their creation.306 The
function of the workpapers—the purpose for which they are created—is
what determines whether they were prepared in anticipation of litigation.307
omitted).
300. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 867 (providing
how the exception applies to dual-purpose documents); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at
887 ("If a document is prepared for something that people do all the time then it should not
be given work-product protection just because litigation is also a possibility.").
301. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970) ("Materials
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided
by this subdivision.").
302. See supra note 301 (providing language from the Advisory Committee’s Notes).
303. Lischer, supra note 57, at 556–57.
304. See Goosman v. A Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1963) ("[The accident
reports] were made in the ordinary course of business under ICC regulations and do not
represent the lawyer’s work product . . . ." (citations omitted)).
305. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions provided in
the Advisory Committee’s Notes).
306. See Ventry, Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
878 (stating that determining whether the work product doctrine applies requires a court to
ask why the materials were created, and that the contents of the materials are only relevant
for answering why the materials were created).
307. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 870 (stating that
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Even if a court considered the workpapers to contain predictions of
potential litigation outcomes over particular transactions, it may do so only
in determining the reason for their creation.308 As stated, tax accrual
workpapers are created to comply with regulations requiring the
certification of a public corporation’s financial statements, which is
separate and unrelated to litigation.309 They are prepared (1) in the ordinary
course of business, (2) pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, and (3) for nonlitigation purposes.310
A public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers fall under the "ordinary
course of business exception." They are created to comply with statutory
requirements, which is a specific example provided by the Advisory
Committee to show when the exception applies. The workpapers are not
dual-purpose documents because they fail to serve any litigation purpose.311
Even if considered to be dual-purpose documents, Textron’s workpapers
would have been created in essentially similar fashion to provide Ernst &
Young with sufficient information to certify its financial statements,
regardless of the potential for litigation over any of the items listed.312 The
functionality of tax accrual workpapers—to provide a corporation’s outside
auditor with sufficient information to certify the corporation’s financial

tax preparation materials require courts to recognize the difference between content and
function, and that courts that focus on the content of the materials disregard "the work
product doctrine’s primary concern with why a document was prepared, rather than what it
includes").
308. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 557 ("The subject matter of the tax accrual
workpapers . . . might eventually result in litigation, but the tax accrual workpapers clearly
are not prepared for, and are not part of, the litigation process . . . .").
309. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 870 ("While the
content of tax materials—including tax accrual workpapers—can include discussions of
potential litigation success or failure for particular transactions, the function of the
materials . . . is mandated by independent, superseding authority unrelated to potential
litigation.").
310. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 557 (stating that the workpapers fall within each of
the three exceptions to the scope of the work product doctrine established by the Advisory
Committee).
311. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text (explaining why a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers do not qualify as dual-purpose documents).
312. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing Textron’s reasons for
creating tax accrual workpapers); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 885–86 (explaining
that courts will grant work product protection to dual-purpose documents provided that one
of the purposes is motivated by litigation, "provided that the documents would not have been
prepared in substantially identical form even had there been no litigation purpose" (emphasis
added)).
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statements—is separate and independent from litigation.313 That the content
of the workpapers may be related to matters potentially litigated is
irrelevant. Tax accrual workpapers fall under not one, but all three of the
exceptions provided by the Advisory Committee’s Notes.314 It is unlikely
that a proponent of applying work product immunity to the workpapers
could prove that none of the three exceptions apply.315 Thus, a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers are produced in the ordinary course of
business and do not deserve work product protection.
B. Litigation Is Too Remote to Be Reasonably Anticipated
Although the majority in Textron relies primarily on analysis of the
motivational component to arrive at its holding, it is important to point out
that the temporal component of "in anticipation of litigation" cannot be
satisfied by a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers.316 To satisfy the
temporal requirement, a party seeking work product protection must show
not only a subjective belief that litigation is realistically possible, but it
must show that belief to be objectively reasonable at the time the
documents or materials are created as well.317
Tax accrual workpapers expert Dennis Ventry, Jr. elaborates on what
satisfies these requirements: "The mere mention or fear of being sued is not
enough, nor is the remote possibility of future litigation. Rather, for a court
to grant work product immunity, the applicant must demonstrate a more
immediate showing of anticipated litigation . . . ."318 Federal courts have
interpreted the temporal component of "anticipation of litigation" to mean
"litigation is imminent," "litigation is impending," "there is more than an
inchoate chance of litigation," and "there is more than a remote prospect of

313. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 23–24 (providing the purpose for preparing tax accrual
workpapers).
314. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (providing the Advisory Committee’s
Notes).
315. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 557 (discussing the possibility for tax accrual
workpapers to fall under all three exceptions to work product protection).
316. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the temporal component of "in anticipation of
litigation").
317. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
880 (arguing that anticipating litigation is never reasonable with respect to the creation of tax
accrual workpapers).
318. Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
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litigation."319 A popular treatise on the subject states that "for work-product
protection from discovery to attach to a particular document, the probability
of litigation must be substantial and the commencement of litigation must
be imminent."320
It is unlikely that the creation of the workpapers could satisfy any of
these standards.321 The tax returns at issue in Textron were from 1998–
2001, and notice of the IRS audit for this period was in 2003.322 That
means that, at the earliest, Textron could have an objectively reasonable
belief that litigation was possible at least two years after the creation of the
tax accrual workpapers at issue.323 If documents created at least two years
prior to having more than an inchoate possibility of litigation are considered
to be "in anticipation of litigation," it is difficult to know what, if any,
materials would actually fail to satisfy the temporal component.
If the First Circuit had extended work product protection to cover the
tax accrual workpapers in Textron, then it would have vastly expanded the
scope of the doctrine beyond what it was originally intended to cover.324
Unless the temporal component of "anticipation of litigation" is disregarded
altogether, a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers and the reasons
for their creation are too remote from the possibility for potential litigation
to be considered prepared in anticipation of litigation.325
C. An IRS Audit and Subsequent Proceedings Do Not Qualify as Litigation
Despite common misconceptions about what an IRS audit entails,
courts cannot correctly conclude that an IRS audit is litigation.326 A
319. SPAHN, supra note 63, at 468–70.
320. EPSTEIN, supra note 59, at 884.
321. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
880 ("The temporal connection between preparation of the documents and the
commencement of litigation is too attenuated and fraught with uncertainty to support
immunizing documents from discovery under the work product doctrine.").
322. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 23 (providing background facts of the case).
323. See Lischer, supra note 57, at 554 ("[A]ctual litigation is not imminent or even
likely at the time of preparation of tax accrual workpapers.").
324. See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text (providing the underlying reasons
for the work product doctrine’s creation in Hickman); see also Ventry, A Primer on Tax
Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 882 (expressing concern about
expanding the work product doctrine beyond its intended limitations).
325. See Lischer, supra notes 57, at 557 (stating that tax accrual workpapers are not
prepared for litigation and are prepared out of business necessity).
326. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
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corporation may reasonably anticipate an annual IRS audit, but doing so
does not mean that it can also reasonably anticipate litigation.327 "The
relationship between taxpayers and the government is not inherently
adversarial, particularly as that term is used to describe litigation in the
context of work product analysis. Planning a transaction, reporting a
position on a return, or even undergoing an audit is far removed from the
adversarial arena."328
Although there is the potential for tax disputes to be litigated between
a taxpayer and the IRS, the administrative process of undergoing an audit
does not constitute an adversarial proceeding.329 An IRS audit has in fact
been called the "antechamber to litigation," and is intended to be
A subsequent administrative
cooperative rather than adversarial.330
challenge or proposed adjustment does not include an important element of
litigation or an adversarial hearing—the ability to cross-examine
witnesses.331 The U.S. Supreme Court provides a useful summary of what a
taxpayer can expect after receiving notice of an IRS audit:
[The IRS] conducts examinations or audits of taxpayers’ returns and
affairs. If, after the conclusion of the audit and any internal
administrative appeals, the IRS concludes that the taxpayer owes a
deficiency, it issues a formal notice of deficiency . . . . Upon receiving
notice of deficiency, the taxpayer has, broadly speaking, four options:
(1) he can accept the IRS’s ruling and pay the amount of the deficiency;
(2) he can petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency;
(3) he can pay the amount of deficiency and, after exhausting an
880 (stating that there is a demonstrated misunderstanding of tax dispute resolution
procedures among the federal courts).
327. See Abel Inv. Co. v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D. Neb. 1971) (stating that
an IRS audit is not litigation).
328. Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 870–71 (citations
omitted).
329. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024, at 502–03 (2010) ("[L]itigation should be
understood generally to include proceedings before administrative tribunals if they are of an
adversarial nature." (emphasis added)).
330. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999).
331. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
880 (arguing that "tax administration does not amount to an adversarial proceeding" for
purposes of the work product doctrine). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not define "litigation," the Special Master’s Guidelines for the Resolution of Privilege
Claims define it as "a proceeding in court or administrative tribunal in which the parties have
the right to cross-examine witnesses or to subject an opposing party’s presentation of proof
to equivalent disputation." Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations
omitted).
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administrative claim, bring suit for a refund in the Claims Court or in
district court; or (4) he can do nothing and await steps by the IRS or the
Government to collect the tax.332

The IRS has the ability to collect tax by nonjudicial means, and the
potential for litigation does not refute that the IRS seeks to use materials in
an "extrajudicial" assessment of a tax deficiency.333 Additionally, the IRS
provides ample alternatives to litigation that are used more frequently to
resolve tax disputes; these include (1) claims processing, (2) negotiation
procedures, and (3) settlement procedures.334 Any disputed issue always
has the potential to be litigated, so the fact that an IRS audit may lead to
litigation over a disputed tax position is unpersuasive. An IRS audit and
subsequent administrative hearings do not amount to litigation or give a
taxpayer a reasonable belief that litigation is imminent.335
Textron’s particular relationship with the IRS is further evidence that
an IRS audit rarely leads to litigation.336 During Textron’s previous eight
audit cycles dating back to 1959, among the thousands of proposed
adjustments by the IRS, the parties litigated disputed issues only three
times.337 That amounts to less than 1% of the proposed adjustments, which
corroborates that the likelihood of an IRS audit ever leading to litigation is
minimal, if not nonexistent.338 Even the litigation at issue in Textron arose
out of the unusual request for a corporation’s tax accrual workpapers, due
332. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 478 (1983) (citations omitted).
333. See id. at 480–81 (arguing that the purpose of an IRS audit is not to prepare or
conduct litigation but "to assess the amount of tax liability through administrative
channels").
334. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 1.08[3] (2d rev. ed.
2005) (listing the informal administrative actions provided by the IRS, which account for the
most frequent manner in which the IRS acts to carry out its statutory mandate).
335. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
882 ("The relationship between the parties may later become adversarial, but not before the
taxpayer has exhausted all levels of administrative review, and not merely because the IRS
seeks adjustment to the taxpayer’s liability.").
336. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 ("Textron agreed that it usually settled disputes with
the IRS through negotiation or concession or at worst through the formal IRS administrative
process; but it testified that sometimes it had litigated disputed tax issues in federal court.").
337. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
882 (providing background information about Textron’s relationship with the IRS).
338. See id. (stating that as a "matter of logic or mathematical probability" a
corporation can never reasonably anticipate litigation with the IRS when creating its tax
accrual workpapers). The Supreme Court has conceded, with respect to litigation being a
remote contingency of an IRS audit, that "[t]here may conceivably be instances in which the
chances of litigation are so low that it cannot be considered a realistic possibility . . . ."
United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 483 n.7 (1983).
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to the IRS’s inability to understand Textron’s SILO transactions without
more information to clarify ambiguities on its tax return.339 Thus, only
when the IRS manages to identify, investigate, and dispute a particular tax
item on a corporation’s return, and the corporation manages to exhaust all
of its administrative avenues,340 is litigation a possibility.341 The potential
for an IRS audit and subsequent administrative proceedings is not litigation
for purposes of the work product doctrine.
Therefore, a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers, at the time of their creation, are not
prepared "in anticipation of litigation."
D. Public Policy Favors Compliance and the Exposure of Tax-Sheltering
Activities
The First Circuit in Textron acknowledged the public policy concerns
related to enforcing the country’s tax laws effectively and promoting the
transparency of public corporations.342 The tax returns of corporate
taxpayers often involve a high volume of sophisticated transactions and
typically run thousands of pages.343 Requiring the disclosure of tax
preparation materials, such as tax accrual workpapers, for public
corporations will aid the IRS effort to (1) identify tax-sheltering
transactions, (2) verify the accuracy of the taxpayer’s return, and
(3) evaluate the substance of the transaction—which are crucial to the
effective enforcement of the nation’s self-assessment system.344 Some may
339. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
881 (providing background facts of Textron).
340. See id. at 881–82 (providing examples of administrative avenues available to a
taxpayer, including (1) negotiations, (2) conferences with IRS audit managers,
(3) accelerated resolution through fast-track settlement program, and (4) independent review
by the IRS Office of Appeals).
341. See id. at 882 (arguing that litigation will occur in "exceedingly rare
circumstances").
342. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 ("The practical problems confronting the IRS in
discovering under-reporting of corporate taxes, which is likely endemic, are serious. . . . It is
because the collection of revenues is essential to government that administrative discovery,
along with many other comparatively useful tools, are furnished to the IRS.").
343. See id. ("Textron’s return is massive—constituting more than 4,000 pages . . . .").
344. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 871 (stating that
tax preparation materials would complement the IRS’s regulatory functions); Lischer, supra
note 57, at 534 ("The U.S. tax system relies to a significant extent on self-reporting by
taxpayers, and enforcement of such a self-reporting system requires that the IRS be given
appropriate investigatory tools to confirm that the self-reporting was correct.") (citations
omitted).
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argue that such disclosures are "unfair" to the taxpayer,345 but permitting
the IRS to use these materials "reinforces legislative and regulatory
antishelter efforts emphasizing transparency rather than secrecy, more
rather than less cooperation."346
The U.S. Supreme Court firmly established that public policy is in
favor of more disclosure to the government with respect to a taxpayer’s
tax liability: "Our complex and comprehensive system of federal
taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, demands
that all taxpayers be forthright . . . . Without such disclosure, and the
concomitant power of the Government to compel disclosure, our national
tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed."347 The
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the IRS summons power under
26 U.S.C. § 7602348 favors disclosure even when a countervailing interest
exists.349 In this context, allowing the IRS to request a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers serves the substantial public
interest of promoting fair and equal enforcement of the nation’s tax laws,
which significantly outweighs any countervailing interest underlying the
"I want to keep this information hidden, but I have nothing to hide"
argument.350
Recent laws and regulations that promote the transparency of public
corporations also reflect the necessity to ensure tax compliance and
expose tax-sheltering practices.351
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
345. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 ("Textron apparently thinks it is ‘unfair’ for the
government to have access to its spreadsheets, but tax collection is not a game.").
346. Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 871.
347. United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 815–16 (1984).
348. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2006) (stating that "for the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the
liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any such liability" the
IRS commissioner is authorized to examine and summon certain materials).
349. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1980) ("There is thus a
formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed
enforcement authority of the [IRS] if such authority is necessary for the effective
enforcement of the revenue laws . . . ."); Lischer, supra note 57, at 534–36 (providing
examples of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the IRS summons power and concluding
that providing the IRS effective enforcement tools is a substantial public interest).
350. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 879 ("In the
world of tax regulation, taxpayers and their advisors possess the information that tax
regulators seek. The goal is to keep as much of the information from the IRS as possible,
and taxpayers pay considerable sums of money to those advisors most skilled at
concealment.").
351. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing how the tax gap and drop in
public confidence concerning the reliability of public companies’ financial statements led to

THE RIGHT ANSWER TO A BILLION-DOLLAR QUESTION

2029

2002352 imposes broad-sweeping regulation on corporations, requires
principal executive officers and principal financial officers to certify
financial statements and internal controls under penalties of perjury, and
mandates greater disclosure of information to regulators and investors.353
The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Financial Interpretive
Statement 48 (FIN 48)354 establishes baseline "criteria for the recognition,
derecognition, measurement, classification, and disclosure of the financial
impact of a company’s income tax positions."355 FIN 48 requires public
corporations to assess whether their tax positions are more-likely-than-not
sustainable upon examination, and if a particular position does not meet that
threshold then the corporation must provide adequate reserves to cover any
related contingent liabilities.356 Additionally, recent amendments to
Circular 230357 require practitioners to disclose to the taxpayer and the
government tax positions that do not meet the more-likely-than-not
standard for sustainability.358 The amendments further specify that
"disclosures failing to meet the [more-likely-than-not] standard must state
the fact prominently" and "the opinion cannot be used by the taxpayer for
purposes of avoiding underpayment penalties."359 These are only a few
sweeping reform to promote compliance, transparency, and disclosure).
352. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(subjecting corporations to stricter disclosure rules and internal controls, and establishing the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate auditors of public companies).
353. See Jung, supra note 17, at 393–94 (stating that the Act was passed in response to
the "growing flurry of scandals"); Wells, supra note 6, at 651–52 (describing the SarbanesOxley Act’s elements).
354. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes, in 281-B FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES 3 (June 2006)
(stating that evaluating a company’s tax position requires (1) determining if the tax position
is more-likely-than-not to be sustained upon examination, and, if so, (2) a recognition on the
company’s financial statement of the largest amount benefit that has a greater than 50%
likelihood of being realized).
355. Wells, supra note 6, at 654.
356. See id. at 654–56 (discussing the requirements and effect of FIN 48); Ventry,
Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 883 (describing the elements of FIN
48, and how FIN 48 affects disclosures on financial statements of public corporations).
357. See Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
Accountants, Enrolled Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, Enrolled Retirement Plan Agents, and
Appraisers before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2011) (establishing rules
governing the recognition of attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and
other persons representing taxpayers before the IRS).
358. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 882 (describing
the increased reporting requirement of tax practitioners under Circular 230).
359. Id.
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examples of the effort to promote transparency and disclosure, which favors
Textron’s refusal to extend work product protection to tax accrual
workpapers.
It is apparent from Supreme Court opinions,360 recent regulatory
efforts,361 and general public sentiment362 that public policy favors the
disclosure of tax accrual workpapers rather than supporting their protection
under the work product doctrine.363 Noncompliance and tax-sheltering
practices are well-evidenced problems.
Statistics show that large
corporations have claimed tax benefits ranging in the hundreds of millions
to billions of dollars, due mainly to their ability to underpay tax obligations
and then take a wait-and-see-approach under the nation’s self-assessment
system.364 This approach to paying taxes places "a significant burden on
the IRS and increases the ongoing tax gap at a time when the country needs
to motivate its taxpayers to pay their taxes in full in a timely way."365 Thus,
encouraging tax compliance and discouraging tax-sheltering practices are
substantial public policy concerns that favor the disclosure of a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers in this context.366
E. The IRS Has a Substantial Need for Tax Accrual Workpapers
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that even if documents or
materials are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, they can be
discoverable if the party challenging work product protection "shows that it
360. See supra notes 347–50 and accompanying text (providing the Supreme Court’s
support for disclosure and enforcement).
361. See supra notes 351–59 and accompanying text (offering examples of the
regulatory effort to require disclosure, transparency, and compliance).
362. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (providing statistically, in 2010, that 97%
of Americans agree it is every American’s civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes, and that
96% of Americans agree everyone who cheats on their taxes should be held accountable).
363. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (providing statistically that the majority
of Americans (98%) feel that it is more important to ensure that corporations are reporting
and paying taxes correctly than high-income taxpayers, small businesses, and low-income
taxpayers).
364. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing 2007 statistics that reveal
S&P 500 companies have claimed tax benefits ranging in the hundreds of millions to billions
of dollars); Wells, supra note 6, at 692–93 (discussing the historical leniency of the selfassessment tax system and the potential to abuse it).
365. Wells, supra note 6, at 692.
366. See id. at 661 ("[I]t is now time to require taxpayers to only take tax positions that
the taxpayer believes is correct and to not accept the notion that a taxpayer can purposely
underpay the tax obligations that the taxpayer believes is due.").
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has a substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot,
without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other
means."367
The Advisory Committee emphasized that courts, in
determining whether a substantial need exists, should consider "the
likelihood that the party, even if he obtains information by independent
means, will not have the substantial equivalent of the documents the
production of which he seeks."368 Although this doctrine is commonly
applied to situations where (1) a witness is not available, (2) the party has a
substantial need for that witness’s information, and (3) the party cannot
otherwise receive it, the IRS can argue that it should be applied with respect
to the discoverability of a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers.369
To compel discovery of documents or materials due to a substantial
need, a party must show that (1) a substantial need for the information
exists, (2) there is an inability to acquire the information or its substantial
equivalent, and (3) the information or its substantial equivalent cannot be
acquired by other means without undue hardship.370 The district court,
which incorrectly characterized Textron’s workpapers as opinion work
product, concluded that the IRS failed to show a substantial need sufficient
for both ordinary work product—documents or materials—and opinion
work product.371 The court argued that the workpapers were not relevant to
determining Textron’s tax liability and that the IRS could acquire relevant
facts through "information document requests" and other means.372
However, the district court erroneously overlooked the importance of the
information provided in a public corporation’s workpapers and the IRS’s
inability to acquire that information or its substantial equivalent without
undue hardship.373
367. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).
368. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970).
369. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024 (2010) (discussing how parties generally use the
substantial need exception to compel discovery).
370. See SPAHN, supra note 63, at 587–613 (providing what must be proven to show a
substantial need for documents or materials).
371. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D.R.I.
2007), rev’d, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he IRS has failed to carry the burden of
demonstrating a ‘substantial need’ for ordinary work product, let alone the heightened
burden applicable to Textron’s tax accrual workpapers, which constitute opinion work
product.").
372. See id. at 155 (explaining why the IRS failed to prove a substantial need for
Textron’s workpapers).
373. See Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at
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The IRS may raise several arguments to prove it has a substantial need
for a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers. It can argue that (1) the
IRS cannot perform its regulatory function of enforcing tax law effectively
without this information, (2) failure to hold corporate taxpayers accountable
will place a heavier burden on those taxpayers that do fulfill their tax
obligations, and (3) allowing this information to remain privileged will
encumber efforts to promote compliance and maintain the legitimacy of the
country’s self-assessment tax system.374 The general understanding that it
is important to pay taxes—along with the importance of enforcing
established tax law, ensuring equality and fairness among taxpayers, and
encouraging compliance in general—corroborates that the IRS has a
substantial need for tax accrual workpapers.375 Corporate tax returns are
dense and complex, and are commonly thousands of pages long.376 Without
the information provided in tax accrual workpapers, there is a high
probability that unsustainable tax positions will be overlooked due to the
"volume of materials and the complexity of tax shelter transactions
involved, combined with the funding and personnel deficiencies that
continue to plague the IRS."377 Even if the IRS manages to identify
suspicious tax positions, it may still require more information about the
transaction to make a proper determination.378 These impediments against
properly enforcing tax laws establish that there is a specified, substantial
need for the information in a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers.
Reviewing a public corporation’s tax return and financial statements
does not provide the same or the substantial equivalent of the information
contained within its tax accrual workpapers. As stated previously,
corporate tax returns are highly complex, commonly thousands of pages
long, and there is a high probability that many tax sheltering or abusive

883 (stating that the district court failed to examine the documents Textron claimed to be
privileged and based its findings on pleadings, affidavits submitted by parties, and evidence
presented at hearing).
374. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 884 (providing
examples of what may constitute a substantial need in this context).
375. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 76–77 (arguing that the public policy concerns
raised in Textron and El Paso support granting the IRS access to tax accrual workpapers
under the "substantial need" exception).
376. See, e.g., Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (noting that Textron’s tax return was over 4,000
pages long).
377. Ventry, A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal Courts, supra note 10, at 881
(citations omitted).
378. See id. (discussing the obstacles faced by the IRS in enforcing tax law).
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transactions will go unnoticed during an IRS audit.379 Even if identified,
the information provided in tax accrual workpapers may still be required to
determine what tax liability exists. Sifting through thousands of pages on
an item-by-item basis is not the substantial equivalent of a spreadsheet
listing each debatable tax item, its respective dollar amount subject to
possible dispute, and the probability of liability for each item listed.380
Similarly, a public corporation’s financial statements "do not normally
identify the specific tax items on the return that may be debatable but
incorporate or reflect on a total reserve figure."381 The aggregate amount on
reserve for tax contingent liabilities provides minimal information about
specific tax positions taken and is not the same as or the substantial
equivalent of the specific, item-by-item information provided in a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers. Thus, a tax return or financial
statement, or the combination of both, is not a substantial equivalent to tax
accrual workpapers.
Finally, the IRS can point to its limited resources and the complexity
of potential tax sheltering or abusive transactions as evidence of the undue
hardship it faces without access to a public corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers.382 Such efforts require the IRS "to expend an ever increasing
level of audit effort to uncover complicated and difficult planning
techniques that nobody believes will work but can provide substantial
underpayments if not properly discovered on audit."383 Therefore, it is
likely that the IRS can satisfy all three elements required to show a
substantial need for a public corporation’s tax accrual workpapers.
VII. Conclusion
As stated and correctly applied—when determining whether a public
corporation’s tax accrual workpapers should be discoverable under an IRS
summons—the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 leaves only the
opportunity for absolute victory on behalf of the government or the public
379. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (describing corporate tax returns as complex and
voluminous, which justifies the administrative discovery powers granted to the IRS).
380. See id. at 23 (describing Textron’s tax accrual workpapers).
381. Id.
382. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (acknowledging the personnel and
resource deficiencies of the IRS, and the ability to hide abusive transactions from an audit
due to the disclosure gap).
383. Wells, supra note 6, at 692.
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corporation. Either the workpapers will be protected by the work product
doctrine, leaving the IRS with little investigatory powers beyond taking
corporations at their word, or the workpapers are not protected by the work
product doctrine, leaving the taxpayer to decide what to disclose and how to
maintain privilege protection in the future. This all-or-nothing outcome
could be remedied by an amendment to Rule 26(b)(3) that addresses the
doctrine’s application in a regulatory context, such as a sliding scale
approach.384 But until a resolution gains enough momentum to change the
meaning of "in anticipation of litigation," the billion-dollar question is:
Who should win? 385
Both circuit courts that have addressed this issue decided against
extending work product protection to a public corporation’s tax accrual
workpapers.386 For the reasons stated in this Note, a public corporation’s
tax accrual workpapers are undeserving of work product protection from an
IRS summons, regardless of the test applied by the court. The remaining
circuit courts that have not addressed the issue, and district courts outside of
the First and Fifth Circuits, should view El Paso and Textron as
exceedingly persuasive authorities.
Despite the controversy surrounding the Textron opinion, the First
Circuit placed a reasonable limitation on the work product doctrine’s scope
and helped to level the playing field between the IRS and public
corporations. The First Circuit correctly chose to give the government
384. See Ventry, Protecting Abusive Tax Avoidance, supra note 13, at 884 ("We might
consider . . . a sliding scale of protection for attorney work product . . . . Under a sliding
scale analysis . . . a court could grant varying degrees of immunity depending on the strength
of the applicant’s showing.").
385. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing 2007 statistics of tax benefits
received by S&P 500 companies, ranging from the millions to billions).
386. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (concluding that the work product doctrine does not
protect tax accrual workpapers from disclosure); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,
543 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e believe that the tax pool analysis does not contemplate litigation
in the sense required to bring it within the work product doctrine."). The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia acknowledges both Textron and El Paso in a
case where the government relied on their rejection of work product protection of tax accrual
workpapers to compel disclosure of corporation’s memorandum, drafted by an independent
auditor, because it was prepared during the audit process. See United States v. Deloitte LLP,
610 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (providing reasons for appeal from district court’s denial
of discovery); id. at 138 ("The government argues that El Paso and Textron demonstrate that
when a document is created as part of an independent audit . . . its sole function is to
facilitate that audit, which means it was not prepared in anticipation of litigation."). The
court chose to distinguish the case from Textron or El Paso, rather than refute their holdings,
but stated that "material developed in anticipation of litigation can be incorporated into a
document produced during an audit without ceasing to be work product." Id.
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broader discovery powers in this narrow, regulatory context rather than
permit public corporations to continue underpaying tax obligations and
claim tax benefits ranging in the hundreds of millions to billions of dollars.
Textron is the correct answer to a billion dollar question.

